Why Resemblance is Not a Relation? - Trope Ontology in a Conceptualist Guise

為什麼相似性不是一個關係─從概念論看殊性存有論

彭孟堯(Eric M. Peng)

《國立臺灣大學哲學論評》 44期 (2012/10) Pp. 1-32

https://doi.org/10.6276/NTUPR.2012.10.(44).01

摘要

本論文試圖論證：殊性存有論並不需要將殊性之間的相似關係作為其存有論的原初設定。論證主要依據所謂的「位元原則」。但這不表示「相似」是一個沒有意義的概念。本論文建議，在形上學裡，「相似」可以化約到介於兩個一階內存關係之間的二階內存關係，例如「大於」、「重於」；本論文並且倡議相似現象應該訴求知識論或心理學的解釋。

關鍵字

殊性 ； 相似 ； 齊一原則 ； 位元原則 ； 內存關係

並列摘要

It is argued that Trope Particularism need not take trope-level resemblance to be an ontological primitive. The main idea is the appeal to the Arity Principle suggested by Butchvarov. But, this does not mean that ”resemblance” is unintelligible. I propose that ”resemblance” can be metaphysically reduced to a second order internal relation over two first order internal relations such as ”greater than” and ”heavier than,” and that the phenomena of similarity should call solely for an epistemological or psychological explanation.

並列關鍵字

trope ； resemblance ； the Uniformity Principle ； the Arity Principle ； internal relation

參考文獻

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