1920年代美國對於國際合作防制中國海盜問題的態度與反應

The US's Attitude and Response to an International Proposal to Suppress Chinese Pirates in the 1920s

應俊豪(Chun-Hao Ying)

《國史館館刊》 45期 (2015/09) Pp. 59-102

摘要

1920年代中國海盜為害問題已達近代歷史上的高峰之一，外人在華航運與商業貿易活動備受海盜的威脅。其中又以鄰近香港的廣東大直灣沿岸地區的海盜勢力最為猖獗，他們肆無忌憚地攻擊往來華南水域的各國商船，將船劫持至大直灣，再攜帶掠奪品與人質登岸逃亡。以英、美為首的列強，極度痛惡中國海盜問題所造成的外人航運安全問題，故亟思反制之道。然而，在處理中國海盜問題的策略上，美國的反應及作為，值得深入探討。相較於英國的積極進取，美國的態度顯得保守謹慎。這或許和美國在華航運利益上並未直接受到海盜威脅有很大的關係，因此傾向置身事外，並冷眼旁觀英國所採取的各種舉措。其次，美國外交政策素有人道主義的色彩，不輕易動武，避免造成無辜百姓的死傷，對於英國過激的軍事行動，也表露出不認同的態度。再加上美國在第一次世界大戰後，在對外施為上，逐漸浮現孤立主義的傾向，不願涉入國外事務過深。所以，美國多次婉拒英國的合作邀請，或只願意有限度地參與防盜行動。然而，究其實際，美國不太可能完全撇清在防盜上的責任。美商航運上雖未直接受海盜威脅，但美國在華商務活動仍然不可避免地受海盜的影響。美商往來華南各口岸間，無論是運送貨物或是人員乘坐，均大量仰賴其他國籍輪船，其中又以英船為最主要運輸平臺。換言之， 美國在華商務的安全，部分是託庇於英國的保護。也因此，美國對於英國的多次訴求，即使理智上不認同或不支持，但情感上還是負有一定的道義責任。這種矛盾心態，後來也反映在美國處理北京外交團國際合作防盜方案的爭議上。當英國公使在北京外交團公使會議上提出國際合作防盜方案，擬議由列強共同介入處理中國海盜問題時，美國的反應卻呈現出前後矛盾的尷尬局面。當美國駐華公使表態支持英國提案，並大力推銷國際合作防盜方案的重要性時，美國國務院後來卻在政策上踩了煞車，並據遼東司與海軍官員的專業分析報告，駁回駐華公使的建言，拒絕加入國際合作防盜方案。美國政府的表態，使得法、義等國隨後跟進，最終導致英國提案的破局。本文將細緻分析美國政府內部對於中國海盜問題的不同看法，尤其著重探究國務院、駐華使領與海軍官員間的歧異性，剖析其各自考量的思維模式與反映的歷史意義，並嘗試將此爭議放到華盛頓會議體制的架構下進行討論，以反思當時美國對華政策的理想主義傾向及其與現實環境互動調適的過程。

關鍵字

中國海盜 ； 美國對華政策 ； 國際合作防盜 ； 五團公便會議 ； 北京外交團

並列摘要

Influenced by the civil wars and disorder, piracy problems in the 1920s had reached one of the climaxes in the history of modern China. Foreign shipping and trading activities were threatened by pirates. Among these pirates, those came from the Bias Bay near Hong Kong were the most notorious and rampant. Having attacked foreign ships navigating in the southeast China waters, they took ships to the Bias Bay, and fled to the inland with hostages and booties. Britain, the US and other foreign powers all loathed these Chinese pirates and pondered what to do next. Compared and contrasted to Britain's aggressive attitude toward these piracy problems, the US's reaction deserves a closer look, as it was very conservative and cautious. Perhaps, it was due to the reason that her shipping interests in China were not threatened directly by pirates, the US tended to adopt an outsider's approach with a calm observation on how the Britain dealt with the problems. Besides, featured by its humanitarian tendency in foreign policy, the US was reluctant to resort to force in case any military actions might have caused civilian casualties. The US thought that Britain's ways of suppressing pirates were too radical to be accepted. That's why the US usually refused to cooperate with Britain and maintained a limited anti-piracy operation. On the other side, the US could not have avoided her obligation in antipiracy affairs in fact. Although the US shipping companies were not threatened by Chinese piratical attacks directly, her business activities in China at large still might be affected by these pirates. American businessmen travelling between different ports along southeast China mainly relied on other foreign shipping companies, especially the British ones. In other words, American business and travelling security in China were protected by the British. Thus, though the US might not have accepted the reasons of the British proposal to work together against Chinese pirates, it felt the emotion that she also had the obligation to share the burden for dealing with these pirates. Such contradictory mentality of the US was also reflected in the later controversy over an international suppression of Chinese pirates brought up by the Diplomatic Body in Peking. As the British diplomat there proposed a memorandum of international cooperation plan for curbing piratical activities in their diplomatic conference, the American diplomat did express his agreement on the importance of an international cooperation to suppress Chinese pirates and promised to work on American government's endorsement. However, this issue aroused a serious policy argument within the US Government, and the State Department called a halt and doubted the feasibility of the plan. Though the American diplomat tried to persuade the Department and claimed that it was proper and advantageous for the US to join the cooperation, the Navy and the Division for Far Eastern Affairs both had very different views and declared their stands against the plan. The Secretary of State sided with the Navy and the Division and finally decided to reject the proposal. American objection caused such a chain reaction that both France and Italy decided to follow, and withdrew their previous supports, which was a fatal blow to Britain's cooperation plan. This research analyzes contentious views within the American government, especially the discrepancies between the State Department, the legation and consulates in China, and the Navy. By means of clarifying the inter-departmental and intra-departmental contentions, and interpreting them under the context of Washington Conference System, we may have a better understanding of American idealism and her adaption to any real situations.

並列關鍵字

chinese pirates ； American policy toward China ； international cooperation against piracy ； Ministerial Conference of Five Powers ； Diplomatic Body at Peking

參考文獻

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