The Monitoring Effect of Information Disclosure: Institutional and Retail Investors

資訊揭露的監督效果：機構與散戶投資人

黃振豊(Cheng-Li Huang) ； 陳薇如(Wei-Ju Chen) ； 呂國禎(Kuo-Chen Lu)

《International Journal of Information and Management Sciences》 25卷Special Issue (2014/09) Pp. i+197-214

https://doi.org/10.6186/IJIMS.2014.25.3.1

摘要

Huang and Zhang（2012）的研究發現以機構投資人主的美國股票市場，加強資訊揭露可以降低公司的代理成本。本研究以散戶投資人為主的台灣股票市場進行研究，探討其資本市場監督與紀律的功能是否能有效發揮。我們運用Huang and Zhang（2012）的實證模型,驗證在不同的資訊揭露水準下，公司持有現金資產的價值是否存在差異。實證結果顯示，資訊揭露品質較佳的公司,相較於資訊揭露品質較差的公司，其現金資產的價值並無顯著差異，此與Huang and Zhang（2012）在以機構投資人為主的市場研究結果不一致。本研究進一步以機構投資人交易比重，將樣本區分為機構投資人成交比重高、低兩群，驗證機構投資人及散戶投資人的監督效果是否有所差異，結果顯示，在機構投資人成交比重相對較高的這一組中，持有現金的變動與資訊揭露程度的交乘項與公司異常報酬，呈現顯著正向的關係；而法人成交比重較低的一組，其結果則為無顯著相關。此說明，市場提供的外部監督機制，主要由機構投資人進行，因此資訊揭露對公司治理的效果，在以機構投資者為主的證券市場中，較為有效。

關鍵字

資訊揭露 ； 機構投資人 ； 代理成本 ； 散戶投資人 ； 持有現金

並列摘要

Huang and Zhang [15] provide evidence that enhanced information disclosure helps reduce the agency cost from the U.S.A. stock market that is dominated by institutional investors. This study attempts to explore if the supervision and disciplinary effect of capital market still exists in Taiwan's stock market that is dominated by retail investors. We use the empirical model of Huang and Zhang [15] to verify whether cash holdings are valued differently de- pending on information disclosure levels. The empirical results show that the cash holdings of companies with better disclosure quality are not valued significantly higher than those of companies with poorer disclosure quality. This finding is inconsistent with the evidence of Huang and Zhang [15] from an institutional investor dominated stock market. This study further divides the sample into two sub-samples, one consisting of firms with high institutional trading percentage and the other consisting of firms with low institutional trading percentage, to examine the monitoring effect of institutional and retail investors. Results indicate that for firms with a higher institutional trading percentage, the relation between the product of ratio of change in cash and disclosure level and abnormal returns is significantly positive; for firms with a lower institutional trading percentage, the relation is not significant. This explains the external monitoring in the capital market is mainly provided by institutional investors, and the effect of enhanced disclosure on corporate governance is more pronounced in the stock market dominated by institutional investors.

並列關鍵字

Information disclosure ； institutional investors ； agency cost ； retail investor ； cash holdings

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