海運承攬業與航商議價策略模式之建立

由於海運航商在爭取業務時，對於貨運量大且事先與海運航商訂定長期託運合約的海運承攬業，皆願意提供較多的折扣優惠。而海運承覽業為降低託運成本及確保艙位，亦願意與航商訂定長期合約。為分析海運市場航商與貨主或承攬業者之間的議價行為，本研究將以Nash議價理論為基礎，先構建海運承攬業艙位需求模式、海運承攬業報酬模式與海運航商報酬模式，再以海運航商報酬最大化求解市場可行解運費；並以市場可行運費解進行搜尋其他可使雙方報酬增加之解集合。最後，本研究以臺灣至美國洛杉磯海運航線進行實證分析。由議價賽局求解結果發現，多數海運航商與承攬業之議價皆可求得Nash均衡解。此外，實證分析亦求得在不同景氣狀況下，當買方或賣方具絕對優勢時之議價解。

關鍵字

議價賽局；報酬函數；海運航商；海運承攬業

並列摘要

Most of maritime freight carriers tend to attract large shippers by offering discount freightage to enhance shipments and revenues. Freight forwarders, on the other hand, are willing to book their shipments in advance with carriers to ensure lower fares and reliable services. This study aims to explore the bargaining process between forwarders and maritime carriers by applying the revised Nash bargaining models. We first constructed the demand functions of the forwarders, and then formulated the profit functions of the carriers and forwarders and solve for the bargaining sets. A case study was demonstrated using data collected from forwarders and carriers who transport cargos between Taiwan and Los Angeles. The results showed that Nash equilibrium existed in most of the bargaining process of the business. In addition, the study provided solutions by taking into account the variation of market demand in cases that the carriers or the forwarders may dominate the bargaining process.

並列關鍵字

Bargaining games ； Payoff functions ； Maritime carriers and forwarders

參考文獻

Gibbons, R.(1992).A Primer in Game Theory.Harvester Wheatsheaf.

Google Scholar

Kalai, E.,Smorodinsky, M.(1975).Other Solutions to Nash's Bargaining Problem.Econometrica.43,43-518.

Google Scholar

張民忠(1998)。以線性模式探討Nash議價賽局。國防管理學院資源管理研究所。

Google Scholar

D'este, G. M.,Meyrick, S.(1992).Carrier Selection in a RO/RO Ferry Trade Part 1: Decision Factors and Attitudes.Maritime Policy and Management.2(19),115-126.