Optimal Pollution Control Policies under Asymmetric Information: A Model of Mechanism-Design Approach

Hsiao-Chi Chen ； Shi-Miin Liu

《經濟研究》 36卷1期 (1999/01) Pp. 1-23

https://doi.org/10.29765/TEI.199901.0001

摘要

本文探討政府對一不知其污染排放水準的獨佔廠商的管制措施。將Baron and Myerson (1982)的直接機制模型加以修正後，我們導出了最適污染管制措施存在的充分與必要條件。在我們的最適解中，政府的目標函數會達到極大，此處的目標函數定義爲消費者剩餘加上廠商的利潤再减掉污染所造成的外部性。獨佔廠商在此機制下會誠實申報其污染排放量，並且賺取非負的利潤。文內仔細分析了最適污染管制政策的相關性質。然而，此直接顯示的管制機制可能無法適用於所有的污染排放産業。

關鍵字

不對稱資訊 ； 貝式賽局 ； 機制設計 ； 污染管制

並列摘要

This paper deals with the problem of regulating a monopolistic firm with unknown pollution level per output unit. By modifying Baron and Myerson's (1982) direct mechanism model, we derive the necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of an optimal regulatory policy. In our optimal solution, the regulator's objective function, defined as consumers' surplus plus the firm's profit then minus externality caused by pollution, achieves its maximum. Under the mechanism, the firm would report its true pollution level and obtain nonnegative profit. Associated properties of the acquired optimal regulatory policy are discussed in detail. Nevertheless, this direct revelation regulatory scheme may not apply to all pollution-producing industries.

並列關鍵字

asymmetric information ； Bayesian game ； mechanism design ； pollution control

參考文獻

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Baumol, W. J., Oates, W. E.(1988).The Theory of Environmental Policy.Cambridge, New York:Cambridge University Press.

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