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技術選擇內生下關稅與各種限額之等價性

摘要


雖然GATT與世界貿易組織(WTO)不斷的推動貿易自由化,關稅與配額仍是許多國家常用的貿易保護工具。這些貿易保護的背後動機除了可以增加關稅收入與本國產品市場佔有率之外,一般認為也肩負著部分產業政策的任務。透過保護,本國廠商得以提昇技術,增加全球競爭力。因此本文主要目的乃欲探討在技術條件內生化之下,關稅與限額之等價性問題。 透過本文的分析,我們可以發現在技術條件內生下,課徵關稅時本國市場價格最低,其次為等量與等率限額,但在等值限額下,本國市場價格之高低則需視市場需求而定。不過關稅與各種限額之等價均不能成立。此外由於存在策略性效果,因此關稅對本國廠商技術水準的提升最高,其次為等量限額,而等值與等率限額之效果則需視兩國產量之變動比與產量比之大小而定。

關鍵字

關稅 配額 等價性

並列摘要


Although the GATT and WTO continuously promote free trade, tariff and some non-tariff barriers (NTBs) such as quotas and VERs are still adopted to protect domestic industries. The protection provided by tariffs and quotas can foster domestic technological upgrade as described by the infant industry concept. Therefore, if we take into account the technological upgrade effects, the arguments for the equivalence of tariffs and quotas, which prevail in the trade literature, may in fact not hold. In this paper, we endogenize firms' technology choices with respect to tariff or quota protection. It is found that the equivalence of tariffs and quotas do not exist. Through this study, we are able to pinpoint whether tariffs or quotas are more effective in bringing about the technological upgrade for domestic firms.

並列關鍵字

Tariffs Quota Price Equivalence

參考文獻


Bhagwati, J. N.(1965).Trade, Growth and the Balance of Payments-Essays in Honor of G. Haberler.Chicago, IL:Rand McNally.
Bhagwati, J. N.(1968).More on the equivalence of tariffs and quotas.American Economic Review.58
Choi, J. P.(1995).Optimal Tariffs and the Choice of Technology: Discriminatory Tariffs vs. the 'Most Favored Nation' Clause.Journal of International Economics.38
Cunha, L. C., Santos, V.(1996).Sleeping Quotas, Preemptive Quota Bidding and Monopoly Power.Journal of International Economics.40
Degraba, P.(1990).Input Market Price Discrimination and the Choice of Technology.American Economic Review.80(5)

被引用紀錄


李祥瑞(2014)。關稅、配額與經濟成長〔碩士論文,淡江大學〕。華藝線上圖書館。https://doi.org/10.6846/TKU.2014.01236

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