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垂直相關產業之成本差異與最適出口政策

Cost Differentiation and Optimal Trade Policies in a Vertically Related Industry

摘要


本文的主要目的是探討最終財廠商的競爭型態及生產技術差異性對垂直相關產業貿易政策的影響。本文建立一個上下游模型,假設國外有一獨佔的要素供應商,對下游的本國及外國廠商提供中間要素,並採取差別取價;兩最終財廠商則利用進口要素生產異質產品,並悉數出口至第三國銷售。此二最終財廠商之政府則分別對其實施出口補貼政策。本文發現,不論兩最終財廠商間採取Cournot數量競爭或Bertrand價格競爭,兩國政府的最適出口政策皆為對出口品課稅;且當上游廠商之邊際成本等於零時,兩國之出口稅率相等;當上游廠商之邊際成本大於零時,生產較具效率的廠商,其政府所課徵之出口稅稅率會較高。此外,在相同的競爭型態下,廠商間的技術差異愈大,則兩國的稅率差距愈大;在相同的技術差異下,廠商之間愈競爭(採Bertrand而非Cournot競爭),兩國的稅率差距也愈大。

並列摘要


We set up a three-stage model to determine the optimal trade policies in a vertically related industry. In the model, both the home and foreign firms import one factor from an upstream price discriminatory supplier and use it to produce differentiated final goods and then export them to a third market. Both the home and the foreign countries impose export policies non-cooperatively to maximize their own social welfare. We find that the optimal export policies of both countries are export taxes under either Cournot or Bertrand competition, and the tax rate on the more efficient firm should be higher than that on the less efficient firm. The higher the technology differential, the greater is the tax rate differential under either of the two competition modes. Moreover, the tax rate differential is greater under Bertrand competition than under Cournot competition.

參考文獻


Bernhofen, D. M.(1996).Vertical Integration and International Predation.Review of International Economics.4,90-98.
Bernhofen, D. M.(1997).Strategic Trade Policy in a Vertically Related Industry.Review of International Economics.5,429-433.
Brander, J. A. , B. J. Spencer(1984).Trade Welfare: Tariffs and Cartels.Journal of International Economic.16,227-242.
Brander, J. A. , B. J. Spencer(1985).Export Subsidies and International Market Share Rivalry.Journal of International Economics.18,83-100.
Brander, J. A. , P. R. Krugman(1983).A Reciprocal Dumping Model of International Trade.Journal of International Economic.15,313-389.

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