負面競爭下內部升遷制度之探討

The Study of Promotion in Negative Activity

王智賢(Jue-Shyan Wang) ； 孫瑋廷(Wei-Ting Sun)

《經濟研究》 42卷1期 (2006/01) Pp. 25-55

https://doi.org/10.29765/TEI.200601.0002

摘要

在相關之傳統職位晉升的研究中，多數只有討論一位員工獲得晉升的情況。Chen (2003)建立一模型，分析當員工彼此間具有負面攻擊競爭對手的情形下，得到正面實力最強的員工遭遇到其他競爭對手最多的負面總攻擊現象，易造成正面能力最強的員工不易獲得晉升的結果。本文則考慮當獲得晉升的員工不只一位時，特別是僅淘汰一位員工的情況，發現當員工能力異質時，晉升超過一位員工之制度將使正面能力最強之員工較不會獲得最多之負面攻擊而易於獲得晉升；但當員工能力同質時，只晉升一位員工是對公司最有利的制度。

關鍵字

晉升 ； 負面攻擊 ； 異質 ； 同質

並列摘要

In the traditional promotion theory, most discussion is that only one member can be promoted. Chen (2003) set up a model to analyze the circumstance that the members have negative activities and observed a phenomenon that the ablest member is subject to the most attacks from other opponents. It will cause the ablest member difficult to be promoted. In this paper, we consider the condition that there are many promoted members, especially when the eliminated is merely one. We find when the members are heterogeneous, the ablest member will not be subject to the most attacks and still keeps higher promotion probability. However, when the members are homogeneous, the best system for the organization is to promote only one member.

並列關鍵字

Promotion ； Negative activity ； Heterogeneous ； Homogeneous

參考文獻

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