政府當局公共財貨提供時點的延遲與社會福利－供給面分析

Governmental Delay of Public Goods Provision and Social Welfare-An Analysis of Supply Side

翁仁甫(Zen-Fu Ueng)

《經濟研究》 43卷2期 (2007/07) Pp. 129-148

https://doi.org/10.29765/TEI.200707.0001

摘要

本文擴展Laffont (2000)分析政府當局公共財貨（勞務）提供問題的模型架構，將政府當局採取遲延(delay)手段作為誘因策略工具的可能性納入考慮，進行政府當局公共財貨提供時點延遲相關問題的討論。本文發現：在存在非對稱訊息(asymmetric information)的情況下，政府當局可以透過採取遲延策略來鬆綁相關誘因相容限制(incentive compatibility constraint)，並藉此達成由代理生產廠商手中汲取訊息租金(information rent)的目的，這意味在某些情況下，政府當局的確可以透過有限期間的延遲公共財貨的提供來增進社會福利水準。另外，文中進一步提出足以區隔可使社會福利水準提昇以及會導致社會福利水準惡化等兩類公共財貨提供時點延遲的條件式。

關鍵字

公共財 ； 延遲 ； 訊息租金

並列摘要

This paper expands the discussion of public goods provision by the government in Laffont (2000). We augment the Laffont model with time delay and find the following: the government can relax the incentive compatibility constraint and extract extra information rent by taking delay strategy in presence of asymmetric information. The above finding implies that some positive but finite delay of provision of public goods by government is actually welfare-improving. In addition, we provide a condition differentiating welfare-improving delays from welfare-worsening ones.

並列關鍵字

Public Goods ； Delay ； Information Rent

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