- 期刊
套利內生化下各種空間訂價之最適廠址與社會福利
Spatial Pricing, Optimal Location, and Social Welfare with Consumer Arbitrage
摘要
文獻上比較獨佔廠商採單一出廠訂價與差別訂價之最適廠址、產出與福利的研究均未考慮市場間之套利行為，本文則將兩市場間之套利行為引進空間模型，分析套利內生化後，獨佔廠商在不同空間訂價情況下之最適廠址、產出與福利。本文發現：在廠商的區位是內生決定下，當兩市場之需求斜率差異不大時，差別訂價之最適廠址與單一出廠訂價時相同，若此，則其產出及福利水準也相同；如果此二需求斜率之差異很大，則此二訂價之廠址不同，此時套利內生化後之差別訂價福利必定高於單一出廠訂價之福利。因此，政府不宜全面禁止差別訂價行為。
關鍵字
套利,最適廠址,差別訂價並列摘要
This paper provides a comprehensive comparison of the optimal location, output, and welfare of spatial discriminatory pricing by integrating an arbitrage factor into the Hwang and Mai (1990) model. We show that the presence of the arbitrage factor creates significant influence on a firm's location choice and thus generates different welfare implications. When the discrepancy between the two markets is small, the optimal location remains the same under discriminatory pricing and mill pricing, resulting in the same welfare level under both pricing policies. However, when the discrepancy between the two markets is large, both pricing policies yield different optimal locations; the result is that welfare under discriminatory pricing will be higher than that under mill pricing, hence reversing the support for antitrust legislation.