同質Bertrand 競爭下的最適貿易政策

Optimal Trade Policy Under Homogenous Bertrand Competition

楊雅博(Ya-Po Yang) ； 黃鴻(Hong Hwang)

《經濟論文》 31卷1期 (2003/03) Pp. 73-89

https://doi.org/10.29628/AEP.200303.0002

摘要

根據Brander and Spencer (1985)與Eaton and Grossman (1986)之結果可知：當廠商採Cournot (Bertrand)競爭時，出口國政府應對其出口品補貼（課稅）。上述結果在出口商之產品為同質且採Bertrand競爭時，並不成立。本文發現：當產品為同質且出口商採Bertrand競爭時，出口國政府並沒有誘因對出口課稅；因此，最適貿易政策為自由貿易。

關鍵字

貿易政策 ； 出口政策 ； Bertrand 競爭

並列摘要

According to the trade model a la Brander and Spencer (1985) and Eaton and Grossman (1986), a country should subsidize (tax) its export if its firms compete with foreign firms in a third market under Cournot (Bertrand) fashion. This paper shows that this result does not hold under homogenous Bertrand competition. It is found that the optimal export policy becomes free trade if the domestic and foreign firms play in a Bertrand fashion and if their products are homogeneous.

並列關鍵字

Trade policy ； Export policy ； Bertrand competition

參考文獻

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Brander, J. A., Spencer, B. J.(1985).Export Subsidies and International Market Share Rivalry.Journal of International Economics.18

Carmichael, C. M.(1987).The Control of Export Credit Subsidies and Its Welfare Consequences.Journal of International Economics.23

Eaton, J., Grossman, G. M.(1986).Optimal Trade and Industrial Policy under Oligopoly.Quarterly Journal of Economics.101