The Strategy of Ambiguity in Electoral Competition

選舉競爭的模糊策略

朱敬一(Cyrus C. Y. Chu) ； 牛銘實(Emerson M. S. Niou)

《經濟論文》 33卷3期 (2005/09) Pp. 279-302

https://doi.org/10.29628/AEP.200509.0001

摘要

為什麼在中位數選民定理的預測下，候選人仍會採取模糊的策略呢？為了要合理化模糊策略，學者常假設選民是愛好風險的、候選人有自己的政策偏好、選民不知道候選人的落點、候選人不知道選民的偏好。本文要對選舉競爭的模糊策略提出另一個假說：當選民對候選人感到疏離時，他們能從體制外得到一定的保留效用。面對此類選民，我們證明候選人即有動機採擇模糊策略。但在均衡時，候選人也不會「太過模糊」；他們應該不會將競選時間花在兩組以上的政策落點上。

關鍵字

政見模糊 ； 競選策略 ； 保留效用

並列摘要

Why do candidates use a strategy of ambiguity even though the Median Voter Theorem does not prescribe it? In order to rationalize the use of a strategy of ambiguity, scholars have assumed either that voters are intrinsically risk loving, that candidates have their own policy preferences, that voters do not know where the candidates stand on policies, or that candidates do not know the distribution of voters' preferences. In this paper, we propose a reasonable alternative: that voters can secure a reservation utility from other alternatives when they feel alienated. Facing voters with such alternatives, candidates are likely to adopt ambiguous rather than clear strategies. In equilibrium, however, candidates do not want to be too ambiguous; it is advisable that they devote their campaign time to at most two policy stands.

並列關鍵字

Political ambiguity ； Campaign strategy ； Reservation utility

參考文獻

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