並列摘要
We show that the underinvestment result in the incomplete contract literature relies on the assumption that either the in vestment is selfish, or the bargaining after the investment has been made is under symmetric information, or both. Contract incompleteness might lead to overinvestment when the investment is unobservable and cooperative (the buyer's value of the good depends on the seller's investment), and the players have asymmetric information during the bargaining (the buyer has private in formation regarding his value for the good). We also show that when the investment is observable but not verifiable, using an option contract might be able to restore efficient investment and amount of trade.
參考文獻
Aghion, P.,M. Dewatripont,P. Rey(1994).Renegotiation Design with Unverifiable Information.Econometrica.62,257-282.
Bernheim, B. D.,M. Whinston(1998).Incomplete Contracts and Strategic Ambiguity.American Economic Review.88,902-932.
Bulow, J.,J. Roberts(1989).The Simple Economics of Optimal Auctions.Journal of Political Economy.97,1060-1090.
Che, Y.-K.,D. B. Hausch(1999).Cooperative Investments and the Value of Contracting.American Economic Review.89,125-147.
Chi, Woody C.-Y.(1999).Quality Choice and the Coase Problem.Economics Letters.64,107-115.
延伸閱讀
- HSIUNG, L. Y. (2019). 不同目標與風險下的最適資產組合之分析 [doctoral dissertation, Feng Chia University]. Airiti Library. https://doi.org/10.6341/fcu.P9946185
- Chan, C. C., & Chen, C. W. (2014). 董事責任險與過度投資行為之相關性研究. 財務金融學刊, 22(1), 61-80. https://doi.org/10.6545/JFS.2014.22(1).3
- 楊閔惟（2020）。經理人過度自信與董監事責任險對投資效率之影響〔碩士論文，朝陽科技大學〕。華藝線上圖書館。https://www.airitilibrary.com/Article/Detail?DocID=U0078-2502202114532120
- 郭志安、吳美玲、李文清（2008）。高職教師投資行為之過度自信及處份效果研究。技術及職業教育學報，2(2)，75-104。https://doi.org/10.6235/TVE.1410
- 曾惠卿（2021）。風險態度與投資行為偏誤〔碩士論文，淡江大學〕。華藝線上圖書館。https://www.airitilibrary.com/Article/Detail?DocID=U0002-2806202119221000