本文建立一個具效率談判之工會的內生成長模型,據以探討政府立法改變工會力量、資本所得稅、勞動所得稅、及消費稅政策對經濟成長率及失業率的長期影響。在此均衡失業模型之下,我們發現:(1)就長期失業率和經濟成長率的角度來看,政府是否應立法削弱(或保護)工會力量,應視稅率政策與經濟結構參數的相對關係而定;(2)長期之下失業率與經濟成長率都將呈現負相關,因此,這兩個經濟目標並沒有取捨的問題;(3)政府提高資本所得稅率、勞動所得稅率、及消費稅率都將造成長期經濟成長率的下滑與長期失業率的上升;(4)稅率對成長與失業的相對效果取決於各項稅基的相對大小;(5)相較於租稅政策,政府規範工會力量對於失業與經濟成長的影響效果相當微小。
This paper incorporates government fiscal policy and efficient bargaining union into an otherwise standard endogenous growth model. Our analysis shows that rising union power leads to a theoretically ambiguous effect on the economy's unemployment rate and long-run growth rate of output. Moreover, the relative impact of changing the capital or labor tax depends crucially on the corresponding tax base. In addition, a numerical simulation is also undertaken in this study.