透過您的圖書館登入
IP:3.135.201.209
  • 期刊

Hierarchy Design with Socialism in Internal Capital Markets

內部資本市場中的社會主義下之組織層級設計

摘要


近來許多實證研究發現,在多部門公司中,利潤較高的部門常投資過少;而利潤較低的部門常投資過多。這現象在文獻中被稱為「內部資本市場中的社會主義」(SICM)。本文嘗試由這個角度,來比較扁平型組織與高深型組織之效率。我們將SICM模型加入一個組織可以經白授權予部門經理,而從一個高深型組織,轉型成扁平型組織的可能性。我們發現此一部門化之作為,會使得SICM的問題更嚴重。此一發現,否定了Williamson著名的M型假說(M-form hypothesis)。另外,一個部門化公司中的SICM問題,可以經白將股權授予低階經理人的方式,獲得舒解。

並列摘要


This paper compares the efficiency of flat and tall hierarchies from the perspective of ”socialism in internal capital markets” (SICM) -a recently documented problem of multi-segment firms in which high-profit segments tend to be underinvested and low-profit segments tend to be overinvested. SICM is characterized with the possibility of divisionalization-grouping elementary business segments into divisions and delegating decisions to division managers, which transforms flat hierarchies into tall hierarchies. We found that divisionalization aggravates the problem of SICM, suggesting that U-form (undivisionalized) organizations can outperform M-form (divisionalized) organizations-a result that is in contrast to Williamson's ”M-form hypothesis.” In addition, the SICM problem for a given divisionalized firm can be alleviated by redirecting more managerial ownership from high-tier managers to low-tier managers.

參考文獻


Beggs, A. W.(2001).Queues and Hierarchies.Review of Economic Studies.68,297-322.
Berger, P.,E. Ofek(1995).Diversification`s Effect on Firm Value.Journal of Financial Economics.37,39-65.
Bernardo, A.,H. Cai,J. Luo(2001).Capital Budgeting and Compensation with Asymmetric Information and Moral Hazard.Journal of Financial Economics.61,311-344.
Bolton, P.,M. Dewatripont(1994).The Firm as a Communication Network.Quarterly Journal of Economics.109,809-839.
Bolton, P.,D. Scharfstein(1998).Corporate Finance, the Theory of the Firm, and Organization.Journal of Economic Perspectives.12,95-114.

延伸閱讀