Government Relief as a Partial Insurance for the Individual's Background Risk

政府救助為個人背景風險之保險

黃瑞卿(Rachel J. Huang)

《經濟論文》 39卷1期 (2011/03) Pp. 33-59

摘要

This paper discusses whether governments should intervene in the private insurance market by providing income-related relief when the individual faces an insurable risk and an independent uninsurable background income risk. It is found that the government's relief may not totally crowd out the private insurance market, and that the government could improve social welfare if it provides additional coverage against the insurable risk only when the individuals are in a low income state. This income-related government relief could serve as a partial hedge for the individual's background risk.

關鍵字

Government intervention ； Background risk ； Government relief

並列摘要

本篇論文討論當個人面對獨立的所得背景風險時，政府是否應提供救助。論文發現政府若提供與所得水準相關的救助系統，則此種救助不一定會具有排擠效果，使得個人減少對私人保險之購買。同時，此種系統具有保險的功能，可使個人移轉部分所得背景風險，並提高社會福利。

並列關鍵字

政府干預 ； 所得背景風險 ； 政府救助

參考文獻

Aase, K. K.(1990).Unemployment Insurance and Incentives.Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance Theory.15,141-157.

Akerlof, G.(1970).The Market for Lemons: Quality, Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism.Quarterly Journal of Economics.74,488-500.

Battocchio, P.,Menoncin, F.(2004).Optimal Pension Management in a Stochastic Framework.Insurance: Mathematics and Economics.34,79-96.

Blomqvist, A.,Johansson, P. O.(1997).Economic Efficiency and Mixed Public/Private Insurance.Journal of Public Economics.66,505-516.

Brown, J. R.(2003).Redistribution and Insurance: Mandatory Annuitization with Mortality Heterogeneity.Journal of Risk and Insurance.70,17-41.