How Expert Are the Experts? A Model for Expertise Cultivation

專家何以為專家?論專業能力之養成

陳奕帆(Yi-Fan Chen) ； 蔡崇聖(Tsung-Sheng Tsai)

《經濟論文》 44卷3期 (2016/09) Pp. 295-331

摘要

我們考慮一個送訊者(Expert)和收訊者，(Receiver)對於真實狀態(true state)有著不同先驗信念(prior belief)的cheap talk模型。在和收訊者溝通之前，送訊者可以透過對其專業能力(expertise)的培養以強化其觀察的精確度。我們考慮兩種狀況：收訊者可以，以及收訊者無法，觀察到送訊者的專業能力。我們證明當收訊者可以觀察到送訊者的專業程度時，信念越是偏頗的送訊者反而越能夠多投資於其專業能力上。和專業程度無法被收訊者觀察到的狀況相較之下，專業程度能被收訊者觀察到的狀況促進了雙方的效用。

關鍵字

專業能力 ； 空談訊息 ； 資訊獲取

並列摘要

We study a cheap talk model where the Expert and the Receiver have different prior beliefs regarding the true state. Before communicating with the Receiver, the Expert can cultivate his expertise at a cost in order to improve the accuracy of his observations. We consider the situations where the Receiver may and may not observe the Expert's expertise. We show that when the Receiver can observe the expertise level, the Expert with more extreme biases can indeed put forth more efforts in his expertise. In this situation, both the Expert and the Receiver are better off than when the expertise is unobservable.

並列關鍵字

Expertise ； Cheap talk ； Information acquisition

參考文獻

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