董監事責任保險對企業避稅決策之影響

THE EFFECT OF DIRECTORS' AND OFFICERS' LIABILITY INSURANCE ON CORPORATE TAX AVOIDANCE

李建然(Jan-Zan Lee) ； 湯麗芬(Li-Fen Tang)

《經濟論文》 47卷3期 (2019/09) Pp. 485-524

摘要

本研究以2008年至2015年之上市（櫃）公司為樣本，採用三種避稅衡量方式（總財稅差異、永久性財稅差異及現金有效稅率），探討公司購買董監事暨重要職員責任保險（directors and officers liability insurance，文後簡稱D＆O保險）是否影響公司管理階層避稅決策。實證結果發現購買D＆O保險之公司，管理階層避稅程度較小，愈不會從事避稅行為。換言之，購買D＆O保險將強化公司治理機制，因而較能抑制管理階層從事避税行為。此外，本文進一步針對有購買D＆O保險的公司，探討D＆O投保金額對避稅行為的影響，研究發現實際投保金額愈大之公司，管理階層避稅程度愈小，愈不可能進行避稅行為。然而值得注意的是，當公司有超額投保情況時，超額投保金額愈大，則管理階層可能因道德危機導致避稅程度愈大。

關鍵字

董監事暨重要職員責任保險 ； 董監事暨重要職員責任保險金額 ； 超額投保金額 ； 避稅 ； 財稅差異

並列摘要

Using publicly available D&O insurance data of the listed firms in Taiwan from 2008 to 2015, and based on three measures to capture tax avoidance activities (total book-tax difference, permanent book-tax difference and cash effective tax rate), this paper examines the relationship between directors' and officers' liability insurance (D&O insurance hereafter) and firms' tax avoidance activities. Our empirical results consistently indicate that D&O insurance is negatively associated with tax avoidance activities. In other words, D&O insurance will enhance the effectiveness of corporate governance, and prevent the management from engaging in tax avoidance activities. Moreover, we also find that D&O insurance coverage is negatively associated with firms' tax avoidance activities. However, our further tests find a positive relationship between abnormal D&O insurance coverage and tax avoidance activities, indicating that the abnormal D&O insurance coverage will induce moral hazard and lead to more aggressive tax avoidance activities.

並列關鍵字

Directors' and officers' liability insurance ； D&O insurance coverage ； Abnormal D&O insurance coverage ； Tax avoidance ； Book-tax difference

參考文獻

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