本文從政治哲學的角度探討社會權的理論意涵,並針對當代反社會權論者的幾項看法,進行分析和評估。社會權的理論家們認為,社經基本需要之滿足必須視為是公民之基本權利,以及一項最基本的社經正義原則。反對者則認為社會權是一種「積極」權利而不應予以保障,因其違背了古典自由主義對權利與正義之「消極」理解及對國家角色之認定。批評者指出,社會權是一種施加於國家及第三人某些積極義務之權利,而此種積極權利的問題在於:請求稀少資源;內容、程度及實現與否難以判定;不具普遍性;所隱含的權利義務關係不夠明確;與私產權相衝突;以矯治後果或事態為目的。本文針對這些看法進行評估,並說明其為什麼是不成功的。本文認為,社經基本需要之滿足是一項正當的社經正義/權利主張,旨在釐清究竟哪些社經事務具有政治道德上的重要性,而必須予以高度關切。儘管社會權仍必須面對不少理論與實踐上的難題,但此種權利之「積極」或「消極」與否,並非其是否應予保障之問題關鍵。
Social rights are widely viewed as a species of 'positive rights', namely rights that impose 'positive obligations' on the state and other people, demanding that they act in certain ways for the right-holders. According to some contemporary critics of social rights, 'positive rights' should not be enforced by the state and treated as a matter of justice. Being positive, social rights are said to be problematic in the following ways: they are inevitably asserted to scarce goods and therefore do not possess the property of compossibility; they are highly indeterminate and not easily ascertainable; they cannot claim the property of universality; they do not entail correlative obligations; their realization necessitates a redistribution of resources that violates rights of legitimate property-holders; and they involve an erroneous conception of justice. This article shows that none of these arguments has any significant force. The distinction between negative and positive rights is one thing; whether social rights ought to be protected by the state is quite another. The former has to do with different occasions for performance, not issues of moral importance.