批判實存主義與價值中立原則

至少自二十世紀五十年代以降，在社會科學的哲學著作中，便有兩個對立陣營。其中一個陣營，乃是「經驗主義」，另外一個陣營，則是「詮釋學派」。數十年來，這兩個對峙陣營之間的重要爭論，雖然早已淪為陳舊課題，但至今依然懸而未決。八十年代左右，英國科學哲學家Roy Bhaskar提出「批判實存主義」，試圖整合這兩個陣營的對立見解，從而針對這類陳舊問題，提出徹底的明確解答。Bhaskar的努力，已經博得國際學界的廣泛矚目，可惜尚未獲得國內學界的應有重視。依據筆者的淺見，Bhaskar的「批判實存主義」，確實可為當前社會科學的哲學研究，提供一個重新檢視的重要契機。有鑑於此，本文試就「批判實存主義」，進行一系列的扼要評述，進而檢視Bhaskar駁斥「價值中立原則」的繁瑣論證。

關鍵字

批判實存主義；超驗實存主義；批判自然主義；價值中立原則；社會科學的哲學；科學哲學；方法論

並列摘要

Since the 1950's, the most vexing issue in philosophy of social science has been the opposition between two different positions: empiricism and hermeneutic tradition. Recently, the important disputes between these two positions have become outmoded subjects, but the conflict between them is still undecided. Around the eighties, Roy Bhaskar, a philosopher of science in England, proposed 'critical realism', attempting to combine the antithetic opinions of these two positions, to resolve this outmoded problem, and putting forward a clear answer. Bhaskar's effort has already attracted extensive attention from international scholars, but unfortunately not that of Chinese scholars. This author believes that 'critical realism' offers an important opportunity to reexamine the important dispute between these two opposite positions. In view of this, the present article try to evaluate 'critical realism' and its value neutrality principle.

並列關鍵字

critical realism ； transcendental realism ； critical naturalism ； value neutrality ； philosophy of social science ； philosophy of science ； methodology