政治遊說與策略性貿易政策

Strategic Trade Policies Revisited: A Political Economy Approach

林奇蓉(Chelsea C. Lin)

《經濟論文叢刊》 32卷3期 (2004/09) Pp. 347-367

https://doi.org/10.6277/ter.2004.323.3

摘要

本文應用Grossman and Helpman (1994)的menu-auction模型來探討政治遊說對策略性出口補貼及策略性進口關稅（或補貼）的影響。本文結果顯示在利益團體的政治角力下,遊說後之出口補貼與Brander and Spencer之最適出口補貼相同。當最適進口政策為進口補貼時,遊說後之進口補貼低於最適進口補貼或轉為進口關稅。此結果在政府對由不同的利益團體所提供的政治獻金賦予不同權重時,會有所不同。當政府為一只考慮政治現金的貪污政府時,本文更進ㄧ步證明,政治遊說可將出口補貼由零提高至最高水準,而進口關稅（補貼）則高於（低於）最適值。

關鍵字

遊說 ； 策略性貿易政策 ； 不完全競爭

並列摘要

This paper applies the Grossman and Helpman (1994) menu-auction model to investigate the formation of strategic export subsidies and strategic import tariffs (or subsidies). The results of this paper indicate that even with political pressure, a Grossman-Helpman politically-determined export subsidy is identical to a Brander-Spencer rent-shifting export subsidy. When the optimal import policy is a tariff, the politically-determined import tariff will be higher than the optimal level; when the optimal import policy is a subsidy, the politically-determined import subsidy will be lower than the optimal level or became an import tariff. The above-mentioned results are different in the presence of class bias. This paper highlights the possibility that lobbying can restore the level of trade intervention to a more efficient one in the absence of a benevolent dictator.

並列關鍵字

lobbying ； strategic trade policy ； imperfect competition

參考文獻

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Brander, J.(1995).Handbook of International Economics.North-Holland:Amsterdam.

Brander, J.,B. Spencer(1984).Monopolistic Competition and International Trade.Oxford University Press.

Brander, J.,B. Spencer(1985).Export subsidies and international market share rivalry.Journal of International Economics.18,83-100.