中間財買賣策略與最終財出口補貼政策

Trade Export Policy for Final Products with Strategic Participation in Middle Product Market

王光正(Andy K.-C. Wang) ； 吳世傑(Shih-Jye Wu)

《經濟論文叢刊》 33卷1期 (2005/03) Pp. 33-58

https://doi.org/10.6277/ter.2005.331.2

摘要

本文設立一兩國出口至第三國模型。二出口國中，一國擁有一家垂直整合廠商，另一國則存在兩家具有上、下游生廠關係的廠商，分別專業化生産中間財及最終財。本文假設垂直整合廠商除了可以在第三國銷售最終財外，亦可以選擇是否該在另一出口國之中間財市場買賣中間財。本文的主要發現如下。第一，在最終財的出口上，擁有專業上游及下游廠的出口國必定採取出口補貼政策；但擁有垂直整合廠商的出口國可能採取出口補貼或出口課稅政策。第二，在考慮垂直整合廠商在中間財的買賣策略下，兩出口國在各自尋求其福利極大化的出口政策下，兩出口國的福利水凖有可能都高於自由貿易下之福利水凖。

關鍵字

中間財交易 ； 代工 ； 垂直整合相關市場 ； 出口補貼

並列摘要

This paper considers a model similar to Brander and Spencer (1985), except that one country has a vertically integrated (VI, hereafter) firm that simultaneously produces intermediate and final goods, and the other country has a vertically related industry inclusive of an upstream firm producing intermediate goods and a downstream firm producing final goods. Assuming the VI firm can participate in the intermediate goods market located in the other country, there are two main results in this paper. First, the country with a vertically related industry must choose to subsidize its downstream firm to export, while the country with a VI firm may strategically adopt a policy of export subsidy or to tax its final goods exports. Second, the level of welfare of each exporting country under their export trade policies may be higher than they are under free trade.

並列關鍵字

Intermediate good trade ； Subcontracting ； Vertically related markets ； Export subsidy

參考文獻

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Brander, J. A.(1995).Handbook of International Economics.

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