差別化關稅與政治獻金

Discriminatory Tariffs and Campaign Contributions

許淑媖(Su-Ying Hsu) ； 黃鴻(Hong Hwang) ； 林燕淑(Yan-Shu Lin)

《經濟論文叢刊》 35卷2期 (2007/06) Pp. 155-182

https://doi.org/10.6277/ter.2007.352.2

摘要

本文建立一個寡佔模型來討論外國廠商捐獻政治獻金給本國政府對本國差別性進口關稅政策之影響。本文發現：1.當需求曲線為線性時,若本國政府較關心社會福利（政治獻金），則本國最適關稅政策是對廠商課徵關稅（補貼）。2.有兩項因素會影響差別性關稅稅率的距離，其一是本國對社會福利的關心程度，其二是兩類廠商的平均成本。當政府愈關心社會福利時，本國應對平均成本較低（較高）的廠商課徵較高（較低）的關稅。相反地，當本國愈關心政治獻金時，本國則應對平均成本較低（較高）的廠商給予較高（較低）的補貼。

關鍵字

政治獻金 ； 差別性關稅

並列摘要

This paper studies discriminatory import policy in an oligopoly model in which the foreign firms may influence the incumbent government's policy via campaign contributions. It is shown that given a linear demand, the optimal policy is to impose a tax (subsidy) if the government has a high affinity for social welfare (campaign contributions). Moreover, the tariff difference is influenced by two factors: the government's valuation of social welfare relative to contributions, and the cost difference among the firms. Furthermore, when the government cares more for social welfare, the tariff will be higher (lower) for the firm with lower (higher) average cost. In contrast, if the government places a high weight on campaign contributions, the optimal import policy is to subsidize imports and firms with lower (higher) average cost will be given a higher (lower) subsidy.

並列關鍵字

campaign contributions ； discriminatory tariffs