柏瑞圖增進的查核機制改革

Chu (1990)在線性稅制的架構下建議一種稱爲FATOTA的查核機制－若納稅人願意繳交的稅額超過某個門檻，則免於被稽核，否則將面對隨機的查核。相對於隨機查核機制，FATOTA機制不僅可增進社會的福祉，還具有柏瑞圖增進(Pareto-improving)的性質。Ueng and Yang (2001) 進一步將Chu (1990)所獲致的結果擴展到非線性的稅制以及勞動供給內生的情況。Ueng and Yang (2000)則在團體成員訊息完備(complete information)下，提出一種適用於團體稽核的FATOTA機制，文中證明該機制優於所有針對個人設計的查核機制，而且具有避免傳統稅制對行政成本的依賴、以及逃漏稅與稅制造成的扭曲。本文則在經濟體系存在可觀察品的情況下建議一種改良式的FATOTA機制，這種機制相對於FATOTA機制具有柏瑞圖增進的性質。

關鍵字

柏瑞圖增進；門檻查核機制；隨機查核機制；可觀察品

並列摘要

Chu (1990) proposes a tax scheme called FATOTA, under which taxpayers are given the choice between paying a Fixed Amount of Taxes and thus being exempted from tax audits, or paying only what taxpayers claim they owe and being subject to tax audits for possible evasion. Chu shows that the regular tax system can be Pareto-improved by a marginal introduction of his proposed tax scheme. Ueng and Yang (2001) extend further Chu’s finding with regard to the Pareto-improving property of FATOTA to a more general setting, including nonlinear tax/penalty schedules, complicated audit rules, and endogenous labor supply. Ueng and Yang (2000) propose a tax scheme which is suitable for a tax group under complete information. They show that every tax scheme for individuals can be Pareto-improved by the introduction of the tax scheme which they propose. As a further extension, I propose a tax scheme which is Pareto-improving relative to FATOTA if there exists an observable commodity in the economy.

並列關鍵字

pareto-improving ； cut-off auditing rule ； random auditing rule ； observable commodity

參考文獻

翁堃嵐(2005)。論推定計稅。經濟論文。33(2)，141-171。

Allingham, M. G.,Sandmo, A.(1972).Income tax evasion: A theoretical analysis.Journal of Public Economics.1,323-338.

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