Changing Grassroots Financial Governance in Taiwan: A Political Economy Analysis

變遷中台灣基層金融之治理：政治經濟學的分析

李佩珊(Pei-Shan Lee)

《中國行政評論》 12卷4期 (2003/09) Pp. 77-96

https://doi.org/10.6635/cpar.2003.12(4).03

摘要

基層金融問題的研究，向來多屬農業經濟學或財務金融的研究範疇，偏重技術理性的政策建言，較忽略其制度設計隱含的政治邏輯。地方政治專家則著眼於國家、派系政治與地方菁英對基層金融的壟斷與操控，沿襲恩庇／侍從關係的理論架構，認為基層金融體系乃威權體制下的中央菁英給予地方的獨佔性經濟資源，以回饋地方菁英的政治順服。本文認為這個從屬關係的定見值得檢討，再者，政權移轉後的地方政治，不再侷限於一黨獨大的中央菁英與地方派系間的關係，競爭性的多黨政治介入原有的賽局，演變為多重合作夥伴間自主的締約選擇。如果基層金融政治為競租的標的物，那麼這個網絡關係的重組與變遷勢必影響基層金融體系的制度演變與選擇，本文嘗試性地提出一個動態架構，期能適切解釋從威權到民主的過程中，基層金融治理的歷史演變。

關鍵字

基層金融 ； 金融政治 ； 網絡治理 ； 金融改革 ； 恩庇侍從關係 ； 競租 ； 代理人理論 ； 地方派系

並列摘要

The conventional wisdom about the origin and development of local financial corruption has centered on the conceptual framework of the clientelist network. The model has built on the presumption that the authoritarian state is the principal, while local factions serve as the agents. However, how would a powerful patron indulge its clients in piling up bad loans in the local financial sector? This paper attempts to address and reflect on the issue of grassroots finance in the context of changing network governance. The changing contours of local finance are shaped by the shifting parameters of network governance, which was determined by the balance of power between the state and local factions in authoritarian period, and now by the complicated bargaining between multiparty competition and local factions. From this angle, the distinct problematic of agricultural finance would be better understood from the dynamic mode of local governance.

並列關鍵字

agricultural finance ； financial politics ； network governance ； financial reform ； clientelism ； patron-client relationship ； agency theory ； rent-seeking