共治可能成為半總統制的憲政慣例嗎？法國與台灣的比較

Can Cohabitation Become a Constitutional Convention under Semi-Presidentialism? A Comparison between France and Taiwan

林繼文(Jih-Wen Lin)

《東吳政治學報》 27卷1期 (2009/03) Pp. 1-51

https://doi.org/10.6418/SJPS.200903.0001

摘要

相較於其它憲政體制，半總統制的特殊性在於其雙首長的制度設計。總統是否願意任命佔有國會多數席次的在野黨領袖擔任行政首長，因而成為瞭解半總統制的關鍵。以法國第五共和為例，雖然憲法並未要求總統任命總理需得國會同意，但只要反對聯盟掌握國會多數席次，總統就會任命反對聯盟領袖出任總理，迄無例外。法國三次的「左右共治」，已可視為超越成文規範的憲政慣例。法國如何形成共治的憲政慣例，對於總統從未任命在野多數領袖擔任行政院院長的台灣而言，具有很高的參考價值。為描繪共治慣例的形成過程，本論文以重複賽局來模擬競爭性政治菁英的互動，發現某些條件有利於此一慣例的建立，例如總統的專屬權、鼓勵向心競爭並能產生明確多數的國會選舉制度，以及一定長度的總統任期等。這些條件顯示，如果共治不會大幅削弱總統權力，而反對黨為了爭取多數選票也採取妥協策略，就有可能演變出共治的憲政慣例。台灣與法國，在這些條件上具有明顯的差異，正可解釋兩國總統面對國會反對多數時的不同態度。

關鍵字

半總統制 ； 左右共治 ； 憲政慣例 ； 重複賽局 ； 單記非讓渡投票制 ； 兩輪投票制 ； 制度形成

並列摘要

Semi-presidentialism is qualitatively different from other constitutional systems by its dual-executive design. Thus, a key issue in the study of semi-presidentialism is whether a president can appoint the leaders of the opposition majority to become the premier. Although the constitutions French Fifth Republic, gives the president to the authority designate the prime minister without parliamentary approval, the president always appoints the leader of the majority party in the parliament, even if that leader of the opposition party or coalition. The three cohabitations of the French Fifth Republic can thus be seen as a convention beyond the provision of the codified constitution. The French cohabitations offer an important lesson for Taiwan, where the president never appoints the leader of the opposition majority to premiership. By modeling the formation of constitutional convention as a repeated game among competing elites, this paper has identified the conditions conducive towards the formation of a constitutional convention of cohabitation. These factors include the frequency of president autonomously exercising his/her power, the formation a parliamentary electoral system that is centripetal and majoritarian-leaning, and duration of the president’s tenure. These conditions can enable the establishement of cohabitation when the presidential power is not diminished and when the seat-maximizing incentive compels the opposition leader to cooperate with the president. The differences between France and Taiwan on these dimensions explain the divergent attitudes taken by respective presidents toward the opposition majority.

並列關鍵字

semi-presidentialism ； cohabitation ； constitutional convention ； repeated game ； SNTV ； two-round system ； institutional building

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