立委選制改變對指定用途補助款分配之影響：第五屆與第六屆的比較

The Impact of Legislative Electoral System Changes on Earmarks Distribution: Comparisons between the Fifth and the Sixth Legislative Yuan in Taiwan

賴映潔(Ying-Chieh Lai) ； 王宏文(Hong-Wung Wang)

《東吳政治學報》 31卷1期 (2013/03) Pp. 53-104

摘要

2005年我國將立法委員選舉制度由「複數選區單記非讓渡 選票制」改為「單一選區制兩票制」，同時重新劃分選區，並確定於2008年選舉第七屆立法委員時開始實施。第六屆立委及政黨領袖在面臨新選制及新選區，並為了最大化其連任機率和最大化政黨席次，他們會如何改變指定用途補助之分配行為是本研究的主要研究目的。本研究以「創造城鄉新風貌計畫」在第五屆及第六屆立委任期內分配至各選區的補助金額為分析對象，從選區個人及政黨選票集中度的角度切入，研究結果顯示選區立委個人選票集中度越高者，該選區所獲得的人均補助款也較多，這可能是因為有立委在該選區較具優勢，因此選民對立委有較高的期待、監督、與課責，使立委爭取肉桶之動機較強，本研究也發現立委個人選票集中度較高的選區，第六屆會比第五屆獲得更多的補助款。此外，選區政黨選票集中度對第五屆立委任期內之補助款分配的影響很小，且不顯著；但對第六屆立委任期內之補助款分配則具有顯著的影響，甚至超越個人選票集中度的影響，這可能是因為政治人物已預期到政黨競爭將是第七屆立委選舉的主要面向，且希望以補助款的分配來鞏固政黨既有的地盤。

關鍵字

分配政策 ； 指定用途補助款 ； 立委選制改革 ； 城鄉新風貌計畫 ； 赫芬達爾指數

並列摘要

Taiwan's new single-district, two vote legislative electoral system replaced the SNTV in 2005, and was first followed in the 7^(th) legislative election in 2008. Based on distributive policy theory, this paper tries to explore how 6^(th) Yuan's legislators and party leaders changed their pork barrel behaviors in order to maximize re-election probabilities and seats when facing the coming electoral rule changes. By analyzing the ”Creating Townscape Renaissance Project” data during the 5^(th) and 6^(th) legislative terms, this study has two major findings. First, the results show that the more concentrated the legislators' personal votes in an electoral district is, the more earmarks it gets. This may be because that when the legislators' votes in an electoral district are more concentrated, there exists a dominant representative, who has greater accountability to voters. As a result, the representative has a stronger motivation to bring the pork home. The results also show that when other things hold constant, legislators' personal vote concentration had more positive impacts on grants in the 6^(th) legislative term than in 5^(th) term. In addition, a party's political power in an electoral district shows much more positive impacts on earmarks distribution in 6^(th) term. This may be because the party competition is anticipated to be the major issue in new electoral system, and thus earmarks were distributed based on a party's dominance.

並列關鍵字

distributive policy ； earmarks ； legislative electoral system changes ； townscape renaissance project ； Herfindahl index

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