關說為法律制定以後,企圖影響執行者的態度。關說對於行政單位來說,是個普遍存在卻隱而不談的問題,只要和大眾利益有關的事務,都會有相同的困擾。主計人員工作不僅在於防止弊端,同時也確保各項政務順利推展,由於資源有限,各方爭取資源都很積極,期望以更多的資源來推動政務,因此經常會有民意代表及機關長官等的關說,使得主計人員必須在承受相當大的壓力之下,而能作出正確的決策,因而造成的角色間衝突,亦會影響主計人員的規範性承諾。本研究以高雄市政府主計處外派主計人員為研究對象,主要目的在於探討這些外派主計人員的關說、角色間衝突和規範性承諾的關係,並瞭解外派人員在面對關說的壓力後形成角色間衝突的程度,和關說造成角色間衝突後,對主計處本處及派駐機關規範性承諾的影響。本研究採用普查方式,共回收373份有效問卷,並以結構方程模式檢測其間的關係。研究結果顯示:(1)外派主計人員的規範性承諾與「關說」呈顯著負相關,而「關說」則與角色間衝突呈顯著正相關;(2)外派主計人員的角色間衝突對於「關說」與「對主計處之規範性承諾」之關係呈完全中介效果,但對「關說」與「對派駐機關之規範性承諾」關係則呈部分的中介效果。
Illegal lobbying is defined as the attempt to influence an administrative decision-making process politically when the decision under review has important implications in many public administrative sections, especially those concerning public benefits. Government officers often experience great pressure to make the right decisions when facing such illegal lobbying from either councilors or higher administrators, especially in situations where resources are limited. These illegal lobbying pressures initiate interrole conflicts and may affect the officer's commitment.This study was designed to examine the effect of illegal lobbying on interrole conflict and normative organizational commitment of accountants of the Kaohsiung Bureau of Accounting and Statistics (KBAS). These accountants are employees of the KBAS, but are also associated with their respective units, and therefore are committed to two separate organizations. A total of 373 accountants over various branch offices or units were enrolled for study. Our results show that illegal lobbing has a significant positive correlation with the accountant's interrole conflict and a negative correlation with their normative organizational commitment. Using Structural Equation Modeling, we found that interrole conflict has a complete mediation effect on the relationship between illegal lobbying and the accountant's normative organizational commitment to the KBAS and a partial mediation effect to their assigned units.