唯識宗與現象學中之「自我問題」

在唯識宗發展史上，嘗出現于真諦和玄奘之間的所謂「舊學」與「新學」之分歧。其中，在「阿陀那識」之「定位」和「定性」問題上，更呈現勢成水火之對立。對於1.究竟阿陀那識是屬於「第七識」抑或「第八識」？2.又其本性是「染污的」還是「清淨的」？這兩個問題，真諦和窺基給出了南轅北轍的答案。由於此一論爭的哲學涵義迄今未明，本文嘗試從一現象學的角度來加以釐清。本文之主要結論是：真諦的「何陀那識說」表示了他是一位「意識無我論者」：而窺基之「何陀那識說」意謂「新學」默許「意識有我論」。兩者之差異並非偶然，而係反映了「走向觀念論」的「新學」和「反觀念論」之「舊學」的基本分歧。

關鍵字

唯識宗；現象學；自我問題；胡賽爾；沙特；真諦；窺基；阿陀那識；意識

並列摘要

In the development of Yogācāra Buddhism, there had been a controversy between the Old School (represented by Paramārtha) and the New School (represented by Hsüan-tsan and Kuei-chi). One of the topics in this debate concerns the understanding of the proper nature of ādānavijñāna. To the following important questions: (1) ”Whether ādānavijñāna belongs to the seventh consciousness or to the eighth consciousness?” (2) ”Whether the nature of ādānavijñāna is pure or defiled?” Paramārtha and Kuei-chi provided opposite answers. Nevertheless, even nowadays the philosophical significance of this debate about the nature of ādānavijñāna remains unclear. Here we try to clarify it from a phenomenological standpoint.The major conclusion of our paper is: while Paramārtha's doctrine of ādānavijnāna shows that he maintians a non-egological conception of consciousness, Kuei-chi's ideas on ādānavijñāna indicates that the New School implicitly committes itself to an egological conception of consciousness.Our result should have shown that the difference between Paramārtha's and Kuei-chi's doctrines of ādānavijñāna is by no means accidental. It rather reflects the fundamental divergence between the idealistic position of the New School and the anti-idealistic position of the Old School.