孟子告子之辯的再探討

Reserch for the Debate between Mencius and Gaozi

楊祖漢(Yang, Cho-hon)

《鵝湖學誌》 60期 (2018/06) Pp. 83-116

摘要

本文從康德「以自由意志為先以了解無條件的實踐」之義來理解孟子，孟子以心說性，而心是本心，即道德心。孟子對此人可隨時流露的本心很有體會，從他有關本心之體悟、論述，以此作為人之所以為人的本性及在價值上不同於禽獸之所在，孟子展開了本心的種種涵義。而此種種由對本心之證悟而來之義理，與康德根據作為理性之事實的道德法則分析出來的有關道德之種種涵義，大體相同。由此可證，以自由意志為先來了解何謂無條件之實踐是可行的，而這正是孟子對何謂人性之理解途徑，此一以自由為先之理解道德之途徑，康德並不贊成。而孟子正由此途彰明義理，此是孟子與康德道德學的異同所在。

關鍵字

孟告之辨 ； 康德 ； 牟宗三 ； 互涵

並列摘要

I adopt one of Kant's important moral perspectives to comprehend and reinterpret Mencius' philosophy. That is ＂our cognition of unconditional practice must start from unconditional law.＂ In Mencius' moral theory, he starts from the function of moral mind (free will) to define the nature of human. Based on his arguments of ＂possessing moral mind is being qualified for man to be a human＂ and ＂the value-based distinction between human and animal＂, he reveals the meanings of moral mind. One of Mencius' theses of moral mind is similar to Kant's theses of free will. Kant, on the basis of moral law which is the fact of reason, analyzes the meanings of morality. With regard to the result of Kant's analysis, Mencius shares some similarities with Kant. This proves that it is feasible to claim that starting from free will can justify how unconditional moral practice is possible. Mencius's approach to understanding and defining the nature of human is in such way. However, Kant disapproves of the perspective on starting from free will to justify how unconditional moral practice is possible. Through clarifying the above questions, we can see the similarities and dissimilarities between Mencius and Kant.

並列關鍵字

Debate between Mencius and Gaozi ； Kant ； Mou Tsung-san ； Reciprocally imply each other

參考文獻

唐君毅(1968)。中國哲學原論‧原性篇。香港:新亞研究所出版。

劉述先(2008)。論儒家哲學的三個大時代。香港:中文大學出版社。

牟宗三(1985)。圓善論。台北:臺灣學生書局。

康德、李秋零譯注(2011)。實踐理性批判（注釋本）。北京:人民大學出版社。

康德、牟宗三譯注(2003)。康德的道德哲學。台北:聯經出版社。