當事件公司發生非預期財務危機時，我們相信治理好的同業公司

When Firms Announce Financial Distress Unexpectedly, We Believe the Peer Firms with Good Governance

沈中華(Chung-Hua Shen) ； 池祥萱(Hsiang-Hsuan Chih)

《管理評論》 26卷4期 (2007/10) Pp. 77-98

https://doi.org/10.6656/MR.2007.26.4.CHI.77

摘要

本文探討當公司無預警地宣布財務危機時，同業的股價反應以了解負向傳染效果或正向競爭效果是否存在，並進一步討論同業的公司治理是否加重或減緩上述效果。實證結果歸納如下。第一，當公司無預警宣布財務危機時，同業的股價顯著下跌，這表示負向傳染效果成立。第二，若公司惡化的財務狀況早已逐步揭露，則當公司宣佈財務危機時，同業的股價不會下跌，表示正向競爭效果成立。第三，如果同業的公司治理較佳（差），的確會減緩（加重）負向傳染效果。第四，如果同業的公司治理較佳（差），的確會加重（減緩）正向競爭效果。

關鍵字

負向傳染效果 ； 正向競爭效果 ； 公司治理

並列摘要

This paper investigates the effects of unexpected firm financial distress announcements on the equity value of the peer firms to examine the negative contagion effects and the positive competitive effects. We further investigate whether these two effects are related to corporate governance. Our results can be summarized as follows. First, when the firms announce financial distress unexpectedly, peer firms' stock prices decline significantly, the negative contagion effects do exist. Second, when the firms announce financial distress expectedly, peer firms' stock prices don't decline significantly, positive competitive effects do exist. Third, this negative contagion effects are significantly larger (smaller) for the firms with bad (good) corporate governance. Finally, the positive competitive effects are significantly larger (smaller) for the firms with good (bad) corporate governance.

並列關鍵字

negative contagion effects ； positive competitive effects ； corporate governance