Test of Coordinating Strategies across Funds: Conflicts of Interest between Fund Companies and Investors

跨基金調和策略之研究：投信公司與基金投資人之間是否存在利益衝突？

林美珍(Mei-Chen Lin)

《財務金融學刊》 15卷1期 (2007/04) Pp. 65-102

https://doi.org/10.6545/JFS.2007.15(1).3

摘要

本文檢視台灣共同基金市場是否存在跨基金補貼之現象。研究結果顯示技信公司與基金投資人之間並未存在顯著之利益衝突，即投信公司並未因要提昇目前績效良好基金或新基金之績效，而犧牲目前績效較差之基金或舊基金，此結呆主要源於台灣共同基金市場並未存在顯著之流量－績效關係與外溢效果所致。

關鍵字

流量－績效關係 ； 外溢效果 ； 跨基金補貼

並列摘要

This study examines whether fund companies pursue a strategy of actively enhancing the performance of current well-performing funds and young funds at the expense of poorly performing funds and old funds. The observation results reveal that potential conflicts of interest between fund management companies and investors are not prevalent. Particularly, fund companies do not boost the performance of either young funds or prior-well performing funds at the cost of either old funds or prior-bad performing funds, respectively. The key reasons for this finding are the insignificant convex flow-performance relationship and the insignificant spillover effect in the Taiwan mutual fund market.

並列關鍵字

Flow-performance relationship ； spillover effect ； cross-fund subsidization

參考文獻

Blake, C.R.,E.J. Elton,M.J. Gruber(1993).The performance of bond mutual funds.Journal of Business.66,78-92.

Brown, Keith C.,W.V. Harlow,Laura T. Starks(1996).Of tournaments and temptations: An analysis of managerial incentives in the mutual fund industry.Journal of Finance.51,85-110.

Carhart, Mark M.(1997).On persistence in mutual fund performance.Journal of Finance.52,57-82.

Working paper

Chevalier, Judith,Glenn Ellison(1997).Risk taking by mutual funds as a response to incentives.Journal of Political Economy.105,1167-1200.