Externality and Optimal Property Taxation: Application of the Real Options Model to Real Estate Investment

外部性與最適財產稅－實質選擇權模型在不動產投資的應用

周治邦(Jyh-Bang Jou) ； 李丹(Tan Lee)

《財務金融學刊》 15卷2期 (2007/06) Pp. 141-180

https://doi.org/10.6545/JFS.2007.15(2).5

摘要

本論文建構一實質選擇權模型，探討政府如何針對房地產廠商開發土地「之前」及「之後」來課徵最適的財產稅。假設房地產產業內有固定家數廠商，在供需均具不確定性的情況下進行土地開發，且開發耗費成本完全無法回役。當廠商開發面積愈大，會減少綠地面積，因而對居民不利。然而，土地持有者會忽視此一負面外部性，因而其開發密度會高於社會最適水率。政府可在房地產廠商開發「之前」及「之後」分別課徵財產稅以矯正此狀況。本模型的結果顯示，雖然廠商開發土地後才造成負面外部性，但最適的「開發後」稅率不一定要高於「開發前」的稅率。

關鍵字

開發密度 ； 負面外部性 ； 財產稅 ； 實質選擇權

並列摘要

This article investigates the design of property taxation both before and after development in a real options framework where a fixed number of landowners irreversibly develop property in an uncertain environment. We assume that densely developed properties reduce open space, and thereby harm urban residents. However, landowners will ignore this negative externality, and will thus develop properties more densely than is socially optimal. The regulator can correct this tendency by imposing taxation on property both before and after development. It is, however, unclear whether the latter should be taxed at a higher rate than the former even though the negative externality arises only after the property is developed.

並列關鍵字

Development Density ； Negative Externality ； Property Taxation ； Real Options

參考文獻

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