摘要
本文建立一個新的理論分析架構探討多家廠商在網路經濟中選擇直接接續或繞道接續的動機以及相關的訂價行為。研究結果指出，不管繞道與否，合理的接續方式必然沿著成本的最小路徑行進，一旦區外部位的互連成本超越門檻，廠商將採用繞道接續。繞道現象一旦出現，將依相同路徑，反向而成對的發生。最適繞道接續費等於繞道需求者的保留價格，而提供繞道接續服務的廠商將獲取此額外之利潤。關於直接接續部份，分析結果為：如果最終財（X與y）具替代關係或相互獨立，「效率元件訂價法」確實為合理的直接接續費定價方式。另外，在不對稱訊息的情況下，我們發現區內部位成本最高與最低之廠商皆有不實宣告成本之誘因。由於此不實宣告導致繞道提供廠商之額外利潤越近於零，並促使繞道需求提高。這些效果有助於社會福利之提昇。
並列摘要
This paper provides a theoretical framework to analyze firms' access pricing behaviors in a network environment. We show that a bypass access is selected when the corresponding extranet cost is relatively high. Once a bypass access occurs, the same access with opposite direction also takes place. The optimal bypass price is set at the bypass demander's reservation value. Hence, the bypass access supplier extracts all the extra profit. Regarding direct access, our analysis indicates that if final products (X and Y) are substitutes or mutually independent, it is reasonable to apply the efficient component pricing rule for direct access pricing. In the case of asymmetric information, we find that firms with the highest and the lowest intranet costs have motivation to cheat. Given the false announcements, the bypass access supplier's extra profit is reduced to near zero such that the demand of bypass access is boosted. Such effects are positive in social welfare improvement.