本研究利用民國85年至95年間遭檢調起訴的非法內線交易事件,探討公司特性、董事會結構與股權結構對於非法內線交易事件的影響。本文發現當公司隱瞞訊息為壞消息、參與犯罪者越多、資訊不對稱越大、家族企業、沒有獨立董事或獨立董事比率較少、法人持股比率較低以及未發放董監酬勞的公司,犯罪者可以利用未公開訊息獲得的非法利益較多;此外,利用Logistic迴歸模型來探討非法內線交易發生因素時,本文發現資訊不對稱越大、家族企業、法人持股比率較低及未發放董監酬勞的公司,這類公司因代理問題或監督機制較不完備,所以導致非法內線交易的可能性增加。
We investigate whether the firm characteristics, the structure of the board of directors and the structure of ownership affect the illegal insider trading from 1996 to 2006. We find that when the firms have bad news, more convicts, asymmetric information, no or few independence director, low institutional shareholdings or no any payment for directors, the convicts can get more profits. In addition, we estimate a logistic regression modeling the probability of illegal insider trading. We find that the firms with asymmetric information, family business, low institutional stockholdings and no payment for directors, due to agency problem and poor monitoring system, are more likely to have illegal insider trading.