Does Debt Guarantee Improve Corporate Financing Conditions? An Information-Based Perspective

負債擔保是否改善公司融資條件？以訊息為主之觀點

陳昌志(Chang-Chih Chen) ； 李育嘉(Yuh-Jia Lee)

《財務金融學刊》 20卷3期 (2012/09) Pp. 71-104

https://doi.org/10.6545/JFS.2012.20(3).4

摘要

本文建構一靜態結構模型用以分析競爭訊息之不完備性對於公司融資及擔保交易間的內生性互動之影響。本文模型證明公司融資決策最佳化與擔保交易供需均衡間存在若且惟若之關係。該模型亦利用訊息不完備之觀點說明擔保交易之訂價對於信用市場競爭結構變化之意涵。本文發現信用市場競爭訊息之不完備性導致了擔保交易之獨占訂價使得信用擔保無法有效發揮其改善公司融資條件之功能：例如融資促進、信用增強等。

關鍵字

負債擔保 ； 競爭訊息不完備 ； 融資促進 ； 信用增強

並列摘要

We develop a static structural model that endogenizes debt guarantee trading over a firm's financing decision in the context of incomplete competition information. The model proves the coexistence of a firm's optimal capital structure and guarantee-trading equilibrium. Drawing on arguments concerning information incompleteness, we show that the underlying guarantee price accounts for the economic implications of changes in the market's competition-structure. Also, we find that information incompleteness leads to a monopoly charge for the guarantee, and further seriously destroys the effectiveness of guarantees with respect to credit enhancements and financing promotions.

並列關鍵字

Debt guarantee ； competition-information incompleteness ； financing promotion ； credit enhancement

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