Government-Owned Banks, Risks, and Political Influence: International Evidence

本研究檢視國有銀行與風險之關係，採用2002至2012年間共89個國家為樣本。實證結果如下：第一，在開發中國家，國有銀行有較高之風險承擔。第二，在開發中國家，選舉期間將增加國有銀行之風險。第三，開發中國家若採普通法、有較高的政治穩定、較嚴格之資本監理、較透明之財務報表揭露，將可減輕政治因素不利國有銀行風險之效果。

關鍵字

股權；銀行風險；政治因素；銀行監理機制

並列摘要

This paper examines the relation between government-owned banks and risk-taking during the period of 2002 to 2012. Using a new database that covers 89 countries, I find that government-owned banks in developing countries tend to have higher risk-taking than those in developed countries. My findings also show that risk-taking of government-owned banks in developing countries increases during an election period. Finally, the political influence of election periods on government-owned banks weakens in developing countries that adopt common law or have higher government stability, more stringent capital regulation, and greater financial transparency.

並列關鍵字

Ownership ； banking risk-taking ； political influence ； banking regulation

參考文獻

Barth, James R.,Caprio, Gerard, Jr.,Levine, Ross(2001).Banking systems around the globe: Do regulation and ownership affect performance and stability?.Prudential Supervision: What Works and What Doesn't.(Prudential Supervision: What Works and What Doesn't).

Google Scholar

Barth, James R.,Caprio, Gerard, Jr.,Levine, Ross(2004).Bank regulation and supervision: What works best?.Journal of Financial Intermediation.13,205-248.