最近許多研究發現,基金經理人的投資行為存在著從眾現象,並且基金的市場交易價格,尤其是封閉型基金,普遍存在著折價現象。此引發了一個有趣的問題,那就是基金從眾的動機無非是為追求更好的績效與聲譽,但從眾的結果到底會對基金本身的聲譽價值造成什麼樣的衝擊?基金折價現象是否與基金經理人的從眾行為有關?本研究證明基金名稱為可交易資產的觀念,並以基金名稱的均衡價格為基金聲譽的代理,理論探討基金的聲譽價值。研究結果證明:在沒有從眾的情境下,基金的聲譽具有價值,為可以交易的無形資產;但是當基金整體皆呈現從眾現象時,則從眾的結果雖然可以有提高基金管理費收入的效果,但基金的聲譽則會變成為沒有價值,此可以解釋基金折價交易現象,尤其是封閉型基金折價的謎題。
Many recent documents show fund managers present herding behavior and fund discounts phenomena in the fund industry. This leads to the inquisition that, although herding was meant to raise the performance and profile of the company, the ultimate impact of herding may create a negative effect for the fund's reputation. Fund discounts may be the result of herding, under the concept that the fund's name is a transferable asset. The theoretic model of the current paper demonstrated that the absence of herding might create a better value for a fund's reputation as intangible asset. On the other hand, when the investment process involves herding, the reputation value of the fund will become worthless despite the fact that herding may cause an increase in aggregate management fees. Herding can be used as an explanation for the fund discounts puzzle, especially in closed-end fund discounts.