近年來由於國際間重大金融舞弊案件的發生,使得公司治理亦形重要,公司治理主要強調內部之經營權與所有權須有所分離,且需有效地設立外部監督機制,才可提昇公司價值。在我國證劵市場中,散戶投資人所佔比重高達百分之九十,而散戶投資人最主要的訊息管道-市場分析師,是否能有效地同時扮演資訊提供者與市場監督者的角色,以加強公司治理,則是本研究探討的重點。本研究利用民國87年到90年間,台灣集中市場上曾被分析師推薦的上市公司為研究標的,以非線性三階段最小平方法(non-linear three-stage least square: non-linear 3sls),探討分析師對個別公司的推薦次數、公司經理人持股率與公司價值三者間,是否互為內生決定之關係。研究發現台灣集中市場上,分析師所扮演的外部監督角色,與專業經理人的內部管理,均能影響該公司的公司價值。這種在台灣集中市場運作的成熟機制,有助上市公司的公司治理,以增加本國上市公司在國際上與他國公司之競爭力。
The concept of corporate governance has drawn extensive attentions after the numbers of international financial scandals. Literature shows that the managerial ownership structure plays an important role in reducing agency costs associated with the separation of ownership and control. In Taiwan's stock market, 90 percent of investors are individual investors and most of the investment information of individual investors comes from analysts. Thus, it is important that the analyst following offers the unbiased information and serves as an external monitor simultaneously. In this study, a non-linear three-stage least-square model is used to investigate the correlation of the analyst following and managerial ownership with the firm valuation. The financial data in Taiwan stock market from 1998 to 2001 is used to test the hypotheses proposed in this study. The result generated in this study shows that the firm value is both influenced by the analyst following and managerial ownership. The knowledge of this correlation can be used to improve the corporate governance.