Do Overconfident CEOs Ignore the Market?

過度自信的CEO會漠視市場嗎？

李韋憲(Wei-Hsien Li)

《證券市場發展季刊》 29卷4期 (2017/12) Pp. 105-145

https://doi.org/10.6529/RSFM.201712_29(4).0003

摘要

I investigate the effect of CEO overconfidence on learning from the market when completing announced mergers and acquisitions (M&As). Utilizing an options-based proxy of CEO overconfidence, I find that an overconfident CEO is more likely to complete an M&A bid despite unfavorable market feedback after controlling for the incentive alignment between the CEO and the shareholders. These results are robust against various sensitivity tests as well as endogeneity concerns and are not driven by alternative interpretations including managerial quality and private information. The findings are consistent with overconfident CEOs ignoring valuable market feedback on their decisions even if their interests are aligned with shareholders.

關鍵字

M&As ； Overconfidence ； Managerial Bias ； CEO Learning

並列摘要

本文透過CEO是否完成已宣告之購併交易來研究CEO過度自信與向市場學習的關係。利用選擇權交易行為為基礎的CEO過度自信指標，本文發現即便控制了CEO與股東的利益衝突，相較其他CEO，過度自信的CEO會漠視市場對已宣告購併之負面反應而繼續完成購併。上述結果在考量不同敏感性測試以及內生性因素後仍然成立，也並非由於同一批CEO擁有較佳管理能力或者私人資訊。本研究結果支持下列假說：即便他們與股東利益一致，過度自信CEO做決策時會漠視市場有意義的回饋。

並列關鍵字

合併與收購 ； 過度自信 ； 管理者心理偏誤 ； CEO學習

參考文獻

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