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董事會在新會計準則過渡期間所扮演之角色:以發行員工認股權為例

The Role of Board in Adopting a New Accounting Standard: Evidence from the Issuance of Employee Stock Option in FAS 39 Transition Period

摘要


我國於2006 年5 月24 日修正商業會計法,並於2007 年8 月23 日制定第39 號公報「股份基礎給付之會計處理準則」,規範企業員工酬勞(含員工分紅與員工認股選擇權等)之相關會計處理。從2008 年1 月1 日開始,企業發放之員工分紅及員工認股選擇權等酬勞一律按公允價值費用化處理。然而,第39 號公報卻容許公司於草案發布日到2007 年12 月31 日過渡期間所發行之員工認股權,於未來既得期間(即2008 年以後)仍不需按公允價值費用化,造成員工分紅與員工認股權之會計效果不同,亦造成許多公司利用該過渡期間發放員工認股選擇權。因公司經理人薪酬之發放主要由董事會決定,故本研究利用此特定期間實際情況,探討董事會特性如何影響員工認股權之發放,並探討其盈餘資訊性後果。本文以董事會成員股權結構、獨立性、專業程度及參與程度作為衡量董事會功能的綜合指標,實證結果顯示,董事會功能較能發揮的公司,在2007年第39 號公報過渡期間發放員工認股選擇權的可能性較低。我們也進一步發現,平均而言,在2007 年發放員工認股權的公司,對盈餘資訊性並無顯著影響,但若公司董事會功能得以發揮,在2007 年發放員工認股權會提高其盈餘資訊性,顯示董事會有效性在2007 年發放員工認股權之決策扮演重要角色。

並列摘要


A firm should recognize payments of employee bonus and employee stock option as an expense and measured by fair market value after January 1, 2008 based on the revision of Article 64 of the Business Accounting Law and the adoption of Taiwan FAS39. Firms with payments of employee stock option in the transition period of FAS39 may have higher incentive of opportunistic earnings management. The determinant and consequence of granting employee stock option in the transition period is an important issue. This paper uses the data of listed firms in year 2007 to examine the relationship between board characteristics and the grant of employee stock option. The effectiveness of the board is measured by board characteristics including the ownership structure, board independence, expertise and attendance. This research first investigates whether board characteristics influence the payment of employee stock option (ESO) in the transition period of FAS39 (year 2007), and further examines the effect of ESO on earnings informativeness in the transition period. Empirical results show that the positive board characteristics reduce the likelihood of employee stock option issuance during the transition period. This research also finds that the result of the effect of ESO on earnings informativeness is insignificant, but the earnings informativeness is increased when firms have strong board during the transition period.

並列關鍵字

Board Employee Stock Option Expensing FAS No.39

參考文獻


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