審計委員會席次、出席率對公司財報品質影響－以董監事責任險的調節效果

近年我國主管機關逐步強制上市（櫃）公司設置由全體董事組成之審計委員會，及投保董監責任險，本研究以2014年至2018年我國上市（櫃）公司為研究樣本，探討審計委員會席次多寡、審計委員會成員出席率兩者與公司財報品質關聯性，並檢視公司董監責任險投保金額所之調節效果。根據實證結果顯示在出席率達100%之情況，席次數越多，財報品質則愈差；但席次數為3人時，財報品質則愈好；而在同樣前提下，考量董監責任險投保金額的調節效果，結果顯示席次委員人數與出席率對財報品質之影響，相對董監責任險投保金額，將更為明顯。整體而言，本研究之結論應可提供政府作為未來加強資訊揭露品質和公司治理機制相關政策的參考依據。

關鍵字

審計委員會席次；財報品質；董監責任險

並列摘要

In recent years, Taiwan's regulatory authorities have progressively mandated that listed companies (on the stock exchange and over-the-counter) establish an audit committee composed of all directors and ensure directors' and supervisors' liability. This study uses listed companies in Taiwan from 2014 to 2018 as the research sample to explore the relationship between the number of seats on the audit committee, the attendance rate of audit committee members, and the quality of the company's financial reports. Additionally, it examines the moderating effect of the amount of insurance taken out for directors' and supervisors' liability. According to empirical results, when the attendance rate is 100%, the more seats there are, the poorer the quality of the financial reports. However, when the number of seats is three, the quality of the financial reports tends to be better. Under the same premise, considering the moderating effect of the amount of insurance for directors' and supervisors' liability, the results show that the number of committee members and attendance rate significantly impact the quality of financial reports compared to the amount of insurance. Overall, the conclusions of this study should provide a reference for the government to strengthen the quality of information disclosure and company governance mechanisms in future policies.

並列關鍵字

Audit Committee Seats ； Earnings Quality ； D&O Liability Insurance

參考文獻

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