中國在2020年4月首次允許外國資產管理公司可在中國開設全持股子公司並申請成立公募基金。中國近年來也陸續與多個國家推動多點掛牌「交易型開放式指數證券投資基金」(exchange traded fund, ETF)的合作計畫,讓更多外國投資者可以直接投資中國ETF產品。本文借助政治調控理論與中國金融自由化改革文獻的視角,來探究中國就資產管理市場與ETF市場對外資放寬的現象與原因。以政治調控理論的視角來探討,本文研究發現,中國人民銀行、中國證監會、外匯管理局等調控主體透過監管規範、核可合格境外機構投資者、新公募基金成立審批、公募基金股權變更審批,以及核可跨境ETF掛牌等調控工具,放寬外資進入中國公募基金資產管理市場的門檻與提高外國企業投資者投資中國ETF市場的便利性。然而,截至2023年3月,中國證監會僅核准5間外國資產管理公司申請成立新的全持股之公募基金。在理論貢獻方面,本文希望補充經濟學展演性理論對於資本市場的政治面向的討論。本文分析經驗資料論證,資本市場的政治性不僅體現在民主國家中的經濟行為者如何因應監管政策而做出營運調整,也包括威權國家如何透過行使多種調控工具來調控資本市場的運作,以達成特定政治經濟目的。
In April 2020, China loosened the ownership control over subsidiaries of foreign asset management companies, unprecedently allowing the foreign asset management companies to set up wholly-owned subsidiaries which can manage publicly offered funds. Recently, China has also facilitated ETF cross-listing schemes with a number of foreign countries, allowing more foreign investors to directly invest in ETF products within China. Drawing on political steering theory and the literature on China's reforms on the capital market, this article aims to delve in the phenomenon and causes of China's policy of loosening control over the foreign capital's restricted access to the asset management market and the ETF market. Drawing upon the perspective of political steering theory, this article finds that People's Bank of China, China Securities Regulatory Commission, State Administration of Foreign Exchange could be seen as 'steering subjects' which deploy various 'steering instruments', including reviewing applications of 'qualified foreign institutional investors', reviewing applications for new publicly offered funds and those for changing shareholding in joint ventures of asset management, as well as approving ETF cross-listing schemes, to steer more foreign investors to invest in China's asset management market and ETF market. However, as of March 2023, China Securities Regulatory Commission only approves five foreign asset management companies to set up wholly-owned subsidiaries to manage publicly-offered funds. Theoretically, this article aims to engage the findings with the theory of performativity of economics as regards enriching the discussion on how capital market is political. This article argues that, the political nature of capital market does not only manifest in how the economic actors cope with changing regulations in democracies, but also lies in how an authoritarian regime deploys various steering instruments to steer the capital market for achieving particular political economic objectives.