開發中國家參與WTO談判之結盟考量與議題策略－以1999-2001觀光立法推動為例

本文在既有研究文獻的基礎上，預設開發中國家在WTO下推動國際立法應有結盟之考量。進而以2000年至2001年開發中國家推動觀光立法為例，探求開發中國家推動WTO立法，其提案內容中的議題策略，特別是議題包裹之切割，對於爭取立法結盟中之重要性，並謀求解決問題之道。從「相互利益」的角度觀察，可知議題策略不當，乃是妨礙其建立有效結盟的主因之一。1999-2001推動GATS觀光附件立法的原始提案國，其所追求的核心利益－防止經濟漏失，以及所採取的主要方法－觀光競爭防護，本非印度、巴西等開中大國所反對。因此，假如其提案內容能對議題進行切割，僅保留核心主張中能為印度接受的部分，例如聚焦於「觀光競爭防護」的雙邊或複邊立法，或可化解爭取印度加入結盟之障礙，而能在最有利的時機善用結盟，使立法大有進展。

關鍵字

世界貿易組織；立法；談判；策略；結盟；議題切割；觀光

並列摘要

Based on previous literatures, this paper presumes that coalition building is a strategic necessity that developing countries must put into consideration in their effort of proposing international law making. By taking the 2000-2001 GATS tourism law making efforts as the case of study, this paper identifies the significance of issue strategy, particularly issue separation, of proposals made by developing countries in the WTO to the effective formation of a law making coalition and the strive for dispute settlement. Observing from a ”mutual interest” point of view, an inappropriate issue strategy can be identified easily as one of the main causes of hindrance to the formation of an effective coalition. Large countries such as India, Brazil, and China were not against the core interest of ”preventing economic loss”, as well as the primary scheme of ”competitive safeguard for tourism,” as proposed by the original sponsor country in its 1999-2001 GATS tourism law making efforts. Therefore, if issue separation had been applied to the contents of that proposal, retaining the portions acceptable by India, such as focusing on bilateral or multilateral legislation on ”competitive safeguard for tourism,” probably could have prompted India to join the coalition at a favorable timing to result in a significant progress in the law making process.