會計師集中度、市佔率與審計公費

過去研究為瞭解審計市場過度集中能否使審計者獲取獨佔性價格時，通常以會計師事務所為研究對象，而忽略了會計師間的差異。為得知會計師之公費決策是否異於事務所，本文除探討事務所於不同地區執業所面對之不同競爭，以及於執業地區取得不同競爭優勢，能否影響其審計公費外，亦從會計師角度探討前述問題。結果發現，事務所於愈集中之地區執業，可能收取愈高審計公費，但會計師於愈集中之地區執業，卻收取愈低公費，再者，事務所於執業地區內獲取愈高市佔率，賺取愈高審計公費，然會計師獲取越高市佔率，反而賺取越低公費。此文證實會計師於競爭下所作之公費決策，極可能不同於事務所。

關鍵字

市場集中度；市場佔有率；審計公費

並列摘要

In order to examine whether concentration in the auditing market can lead to monopoly prices, previous research has mostly used auditing firms as objects of investigation and neglected the distinct ions between individual auditors. To investigate whether there are differences in audit fee strategies between individual auditors and firms, this study not only examines the distinct competition faced by firms in different regions and whether gaining competitive advantages in practice regions can affect their pr icing strategy, the aforementioned quest ions are also discussed from the auditors' perspective. The results show that firms practicing in more concentrated areas may charge higher audit fees, while individual auditors practicing in more concentrated areas may charge lower fees. In addition, the higher the firm's market share in the area, the higher the audit fees. However, the higher the market share of individual auditors, the lower their audit fees. This article confirms that audit fee decisions made by individual auditors in a competitive environment will most likely differ from those made by firms.