Who's Afraid of Modern Sciences? Some Remarks on the Relationship between Life Sciences and Moral Philosophy

有一種看法認為現代科學的最新進展，特別是涉及到人的社會本質的研究結果，加上道德直覺已成為現有文明的社會聯繫。論及我們是誰的問題時，這些直覺，包括我們對於人格、自由意志和人之超越感的概念，正日益受到更具「科學」－即以生物學為基礎－方法的攻擊。尤其在假設我們被賦予了超越本性的特定先天或本質上的道德素質，並保證我們作為人類的尊嚴。現代科學否認這種直覺的科學合理性。從科學的角度來看，人如同其他眾生，基因在受孕的那一刻便安排好的生物學事實。沒有「人的本質」，而只是生物物質。大腦是基因藍圖的一部分；不適應先驗真理的不斷演變的心智，只不過是「計算的天擇器官系統」（史蒂分‧平克），旨在幫助基因生存和繁殖。這種人性的自然概念似乎剝奪了人的人格尊嚴。如果自然普遍於人的自我歸屬，批評他人的批判，那麼道德行為只不過是偽裝道德的自私行動。當我們行動時，將不會有「更高的」動機以約束和限制自己。道德幾乎是不可能實現的。本文不贊同這樣的結論，並認為哲學倫理與現代科學是相容的，假如雙方方法論限制維持在將不同的方法用在不同的應用領域上。這個看法當然不太令人振奮，然而，值得注意的是，通常是哲學混淆了方法論的限制。科學發現本身在道德上不具結論性，但哲學思考本身不應干涉科學研究，假如它仍在其限制範圍內。作為道德個體，科學家有平等的機會接觸哲學相關的問題；而哲學家沒有特許的門路接觸道德問題。科學家和哲學家都可能敗在道德情境裡。在道德困境中，關於我們的生物數據和事實的知識，在原則上毫不相干；筆者將於本文論證這一點。

關鍵字

道德規範；科學；道金斯；康德

並列摘要

There is a perception that recent advances of modern sciences, particularly the findings related to our social nature, sideline moral intuitions that have become the social bond of existing civilizations. These intuitions include our concepts of personhood, free will and a sense of human transcendence which are increasingly coming under attack by world views that favor a more 'scientific'-i.e. biology-based-approach regarding the question of who we are. What has especially come under attack is the assumption that we are endowed with specific innate or essential moral qualities that go beyond our nature, and which guarantee our dignity as human beings. Modern sciences deny the scientific legitimacy of such intuitions. From a scientific perspective persons are to be taken as biological facts like other living beings, geared by genes from the moment of conception. There is no 'human essence', just biological substance. Brains are part of the genetic blueprint; the evolving mind, unfit for transcendental truths, is nothing but a 'system of naturally selected organs of computation' (S. Pinker), designed to help the genes to survive and reproduce. It seems that such a natural concept of humanity deprives persons of their human dignity. If nature prevails in the self-ascription of man, so the critique of the critique goes, then moral behavior is nothing but selfish action in moral disguise. There would be no 'higher' incentive to impose restraints and limits on ourselves whenever we act. Morality would be virtually impossible. This paper disagrees with such conclusion. It tries to argue that philosophical ethics is compatible with modern sciences if methodological limits for both sides are preserved, for they apply different methods for different fields of application. This observation is of course not really exciting news; it is more interesting, however, to note that it is often philosophy which obfuscates methodological limits. Scientific findings ＂per se＂ cannot be morally conclusive, but philosophical considerations ＂per se＂ should not interfere with scientific research in cases where science remains within the limits of molality. As moral individuals, scientists have equal access to philosophically relevant questions; there is no privileged access for philosophers to moral questions. Scientists and philosophers alike can fail in moral situations. In moral dilemmas the knowledge of biological data and facts about us are quite irrelevant ＂in principle＂; I shall argue for this point.