心物因果關係判斷是Knowing-That還是Knowing-How？

Are Judgments of Mental Causation Knowing-that or Knowing-how?

杜嘉玲(Chia-Lin Tu)

《東海哲學研究集刊》 19期 (2013/07) Pp. 3-24

摘要

「肚子餓」的感覺經驗會促使一個人產生「找食物」的動作，這是一個再平常不過的生活經驗。所以在通俗語言之中常出現「因為我肚子餓，所以我去買餅乾吃。」、「因為我肚子餓，所以我煮水餃吃。」等等。因此，「因為我肚子餓，所以我XXX。」可以說是一句具有心理動機以及外在行為結果的句子，也是所謂的心物因果關係判斷。隨著Gilbert Ryle區分Knowing-that和Knowing-how之後，Knowing-how便是指那些經由實踐的體驗而得的知識而且難以被歸為Knowing-that，所以一向不納入知識論討論的範圍。心物因果關係判斷有沒有可能只是Knowing-how：『我知道如何解決肚子餓。』如果心物因果判斷只是涉及行為能力的知識，則沒有對錯或真假可言，但是這似乎與我們常識裡對於心物因果連結關係的認知不一致。這篇文章的目的便是在於回答：心物因果關係判斷是Knowing-that還是Knowing-how？

關鍵字

心理因果關係判斷 ； 可靠機制 ； 行為傾向性

並列摘要

Traditional analysis justifies the view that propositional knowledge has truth values. If we agree that ＂The feeling of hunger causes one person to eat,＂ it seems that judgments of mental causation have truth values as well. This paper attempts to examine the meaning of judgments of mental causation based on Gilbert Ryle's distinction between ＂Knowing-how＂ and ＂Knowing-that.＂ The goal of this paper is to discover why judgments of mental causation are merely Knowing-how rather than Knowing-that. I will also explain how we apply truth values to judgments of mental causation.

並列關鍵字

Knowing-that ； Knowing-how ； mental causation ； reliable mechanism ； behavioral disposition

參考文獻

Ryle, G. （1949）. The Concept of Mind. Hutchinson and Co.

Stanley, J.,Williamson, T.(2001).Knowing How.The Journal of Philosophy.98(8),411-444.

Tsai, C.-H.(2011).Linguistic Know-How: The Limits of Intellectualism.Theoria.77,71-86.

Wallis, C.(2008).Consciousness, context, and know-how.Synthese.160,123-153.