從《瑜珈論記》析論〈真實義品〉「離言自性」的語言哲學及對「說一切有部」語言觀的批判

本論文要處理的問題有兩點：（一）、從《瑜伽論記》的解說，析論《瑜伽師地論．菩薩地．真實義品》之「離言自性」（梵nirabhilāpya-svabhāvatā），試圖釐清這一概念的意義，及其語言哲學內涵。（二）、嘗試分析在《瑜伽論記》的記載中，基於〈真實義品〉「離言自性」的語言哲學，而批判「小乘人」（「說一切有部」）之語言觀存在的三個過失。關於這兩個本文的論題，筆者的觀點是：（1）、所謂的「離言自性」（相當於「勝義諦」）是指就勝義而言，實「有」離開語言活動的「唯事」（梵vastu-matra，可說是事物之「終極指涉對象」）之存在；而和「假說自性」（相當於「世俗諦」），相搭配的概念。（2）、在《瑜伽論記》中，這「離言自性」的「唯事」，是指清淨之「依他起性」和「圓成實性」；而「遍計所執性」和雜染之「依他起性」，則是屬於「假說自性」，即語言活動的範圍。（3）、〈真實義品〉建立「離言自性」的「實有『唯事』」，是為了澄清「空」的教義，為了建立遠離「增益執」與「損減執」之「善取空」（或「中道」）而成立的。（4）、「增益執」是指「小乘人」（「說一切有部」）的過失，他們以為名言「色等『法名』」（「能指」）所指涉的「色等『想法』」（「所指」），是有其自性、法體的，不能明瞭實際上除了「離言自性」的「實有『唯事』」外，名言「色等『法名』」（「能指」）及其指涉的「色等『想法』」（「所指」）都是屬於「一切唯假」的「假說自性」層面。（5）、依據《瑜伽論記》的記載，小乘人（「說一切有部」）這樣的語言觀有三個過失：「一、隨名多體失；二、名前無體失；三、名前生覺失。」。（6）筆者以為，值得注意的是：依據《瑜伽論記》，〈真實義品〉建立「一切唯假」（言說活動的「假說自性」層面），和「假必依實」（離言說活動的「離言自性」層面）的語言哲學，並以此說明「空」義。建立了離開語言活動的「離言自性」之「唯事」是實「有」的，而並非瑜伽行派後來發展的「唯識」說。就此而言，這是對中觀學派「空」教義的一種澄清，也就是〈真實義品〉所謂的「善取空」者！

關鍵字

假說自性；離言自性；「能指」（「色等『法名』」）；「所指」（「色等『想法』」）；「終極所指」（「唯事」）；增益執；善取空；語言哲學

並列摘要

This article will address two issues: 1. From the perspective of Yuqielun ji's records, analyze the philosophy of language of the concept ＂nirabhilāpya-svabhāvatā (the inexpressible essential nature)＂ in the Tattvārtha Chapter of Bodhisattvabhūmi of Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra. 2. Expound the Tattvārtha Chapter's criticism of Sarvāsti-vādin's view of language from the three mistakes stated in Yuqielun ji's records. My views on the above two issues are: (1) The ＂nirabhilāpya-svabhāvatā＂ is simply the ＂vastu-mātra (the given thing itself, ultimate referent)＂, which belongs to the domain of knowledge of the supreme essential nature of all dharmas [just like the ＂paramārtha-satya (ultimate truth)＂]; and it complements the concept of ＂prajñapti-vāda-svabhāva(the essential nature conceptualized by verbal designation)＂ [just like the ＂sajvrti-satya (conventional truth)＂]. (2) In Yuqielun ji the ＂vastu-mātra＂ of ＂nirabhilāpya-svabhāvatā＂ means pure ＂paratantra-svabhāva (the 'dependent on others to arise' self-nature)＂ and ＂parinispanna-svabhāva (the 'perfect accomplished real' self-nature)＂. The ＂parikalpita-svabhāva (the 'everywhere schematizing what is grasped' self-nature)＂ and foul ＂paratantra-svabhava＂ belong to the domain of ＂prajñapti-vāda-svabhāva＂, which is the domain of verbal designations. (3) The establishment of the ＂vastu-mātra＂ of ＂nirabhilāpya-svabhāvatā＂ in the Tattvārtha Chapter is to clarify the concept ＂śūnyatā (emptiness)＂ and to establish the ＂su-grhiītā śūnyatā (emptiness correctly apprehended)＂ [or the ＂Middle Path＂] that distances itself from the errors ＂samāropa-abhiniveśa (affirming error)＂ and ＂apavada-abhiniveśa (denigrating error)＂. (4) The error ＂samāropa-abhiniveśa (affirming error/the attachment of affirming too much)＂ refers to Sarvāsti-vādin's mistaken view of language. They don't realize that only the ＂vastu-mātra＂ of ＂nirabhilāpya-svabhāvata＂ is authentic reality. Instead, they mistakenly view the ＂referent (dharmas [such as ＂form,＂ etc.] conceptualized by our mind)＂ to have its own ＂svabhāva (self-nature)＂ or ＂substance＂. In fact, both the ＂name (names [such as ＂form,＂ etc.] of the dharmas)＂ and the ＂referent＂ belong to the domain of verbal designations of ＂prajñapti-vāda-svabhāva＂. (5) According to Yuqielun ji's records, Sarvāsti-vādin's view of language has three mistakes: '① If we assign many different referring names for a thing, then the same one thing will have many different substances. ② Things do not have substances before we assign referring names. ③ We have cognition of things before we assign referring names to them.' (6) It must be noted that, according to Yuqielun ji's records, the Tattvartha Chapter establishes the philosophy of language that' all dharmas are ＂prajñapti-mātram (only a designation)＂ '[the domain of verbal designations of ＂prajñapti-vāda-svabhāva＂] and that' verbal designations refer to the authentic reality (＂vastu-mātra＂)' [the domain of the reality ＂nirabhilāpya-svabhāvatā＂, and free from verbal conceptual construction]. And the ＂vastu-mātra＂ of ＂nirabhilāpya-svabhāvata＂ is what really exists and is used to explain the concept ＂śūnyatā (emptiness)＂. This concept ＂vastu-mātra (the given thing itself)＂ is different from the Yogācāra Buddhism's famous concept ＂vijñapti-mātra (consciousness only)＂, and this explanation clarifies the Mādhyamika Buddhism's concept ＂śūnyatā＂, the so-called ＂ su-grhiītā śūnyatā (emptiness correctly apprehended)＂.