不可抗力風險的分配在管理領域中,大都歸納在整體風險的討論,鮮有單獨提出作深入分析,且以往對此等風險的處置多集中於合約簽訂前即已明確劃分彼此的權利義務,此對合約期長及投資規模高的BOT計畫而言,投資人會受此不確定風險影響其投資意願;在法律的研究領域,學者多集中於不可抗力的定義、範圍、要件及舉證等方面,在風險分配上,面對雙方合意約定的議題亦甚少論及,因此,本文將探討投資人在投資風險透過減輕、移轉、分配等程序後,仍由投資人自留的不可抗力風險,是否得因BOT計畫在國家整體發展的重要性等前題下,尋求於合約中將不可抗力風險責任的分配於事件發生時,經一定模式分配的解決之道。經本文分析可知,此一風險分配必須考量國家總體及財政上的限制,而投資人承擔風險的程度必須考量其財務負擔能力,此一成果將有助於未來在合約中約定風險分配模式的建立。
It is rare to find separating force majeure from risks, whatever obvious and/or potential ones, involved in projects in the fields of researches; and in the scopes of law study. It is also not difficult to conclude that expertise puts focus on the definitions, limitations, preconditions, citing, and demonstrating of force majeure. Moreover, in practical cases, to impose private investors on bearing the results of unforeseen changes in projects has almost been no exception to be determined before the project is open to bid. This kind of arrangement is no doubt a positive factor to reduce the willingness of private investors to participate, especially on the BOT approach basis projects, owing to its long-term and high capital cost characteristics. Therefore, this paper aims at discussing whether or not it is possible by way of certain allocation rules of unforeseen risks to relieve, transfer, and reasonably distribute unpredictable changes effects between two parties actually occur. The major concern that force majeur risks shouldn't be unilaterally born by one party is that BOT projects are proposed usually under the promotion of economic benefits to the country. But sharing risks indicates covering loses, revealing financial ability and endurance issues for both parties. Therefore, we hope, by putting efforts on risk allocation and financial limitation of both sides, it will help to settle and establish a model for contracts negotiations on force majeure.