BOT計畫非線性談判模式之研究－以負效用資源分配為例

A Study of Nonlinear Negotiation Model for Build-Operate-Transfer Infrastructure Projects-The Case of Negative Utility Resource Distribution

林永盛(Yeong-Shen Lin) ； 張有恆(Yu-Hern Chang)

《運輸學刊》 17卷1期 (2005/03) Pp. 27-64

https://doi.org/10.6383/JCIT.200503.0027

摘要

綜觀目前BOT計畫議約談判互動過程並無數學化模式可供參考，無法事先掌握重要資訊或重點因素要項，致議約談判過程費時且無效率，甚至議約不成計畫終止失敗。本研究針對BOT計畫議約談判互動過程進行研究，並應用賽局理論建構發展特許契約議約談判數學模型，包括談判者風險態度為風險中立之線性模式，以及風險趨好、風險規避等非線性談判模式，並模擬政府與特許團隊的特許契約談判協商過程與結果，探討談判過程中政府與特許團隊的互動行為，並對談判過程之現象提出解釋與分析。另外並探討雙方之談判成本、時間折現數、分擔量效用乘數等因子對於談判結果之影響與其政策意義，並對不同談判風險組合進行彈性分析及比較，以供契約談判應用參考，俾易達成談判協商共識。

關鍵字

BOT ； 談判 ； 賽局理論 ； 風險

並列摘要

To date no mathematical models have yet been developed for negotiating BOT projects. It is impossible to ascertain what are the important information and key elements in advance, which has made the negotiating process time-consuming and inefficient. In sonic cases, failure of negotiation has even called off projects. This paper presents a study on the negotiating process of BOT projects by using game theory to establish mathematical models for concession contract negotiation. It includes a linear model where the attitude of negotiator is risk neutral and nonlinear negotiation models which are risk prone, risk aversion, etc. These mathematical models can be used to simulate the negotiating process and results between government and a concessionaire, to investigate the interactive behaviors of both parties during negotiation, and to provide an explanation and analysis for the phenomena arising during negotiation. In addition, the present research nil not only investigate the influences of factors such as negotiating cost, discount factors, burden utility multiplier, etc, on the results and the roles of future policy implementation, but also undertake an elasticity analysis and comparison for each different risk combination. It is aimed to provide both parties with a contract negotiation reference in reaching an agreement more easily during negotiation.

並列關鍵字

BOT ； Negotiation ； Game theory ； Risk

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